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INSIDE THE BORDER, OUTSIDE THE
LAW: UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
D. CAROLINA NtNEZ*
ABSTRACT
As states enact immigration-related laws requiring local law
enforcement officers to identify and detain undocumented immigrants, the
Fourth Amendment rights of aliens are becoming critically important. In
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, a divided Supreme Court suggested
that aliens in the United States do not have Fourth Amendment rights
unless they have established "substantial connections" to the United
States. Lower courts have relied on Verdugo's holding to categorically
deny Fourth Amendment rights to certain classes of undocumented
immigrants. Commentators have criticized the "substantial connections"
test as an isolated misinterpretation of Court precedent regarding the
rights of aliens within the United States.
This Article, however, takes a new approach. It analyzes Verdugo in
the context of the Supreme Court's treatment of aliens' constitutional rights
both inside and outside the United States. In doing so, this Article identifies
the Supreme Court's evolving approach to membership and highlights
Verdugo's pivotal role in the development of that approach. This Article
suggests that the Court's increasing extension of membership rights to
aliens outside the United States and denial of membership rights to aliens
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within the United States is evidence of an emerging "post-territorial"
approach to membership that rejects territorial presence as an accurate
measure of membership. Rather, the post-territorial approach looks to
more substantive indicators of membership, including community ties and
mutuality of obligation, to afford rights. Ultimately, this Article examines
Verdugo's progeny through a post-territorial ens and concludes that lower
courts that categorically deny certain classes of undocumented immigrants
Fourth Amendment rights violate Verdugo's post-territorial mandate by
failing to evaluate the claimant's substantive indicators of membership.
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1. INTRODUCTION
When a federal district court in California began the trial of Rend
Martin Verdugo-Urquidez,' few would have guessed that the case would
ultimately affect the constitutional rights of the almost twelve million 2
undocumented immigrants living in the United States. After all, there were
no undocumented immigrants involved in the case, which centered on the
1985 torture and murder of a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency officer in
Mexico.3 The defendants, including Verdugo, were Mexican citizens living
in Mexico.4 The events at issue took place in Mexico. The case bore no
apparent connection to undocumented immigrants in the United States.5
However, when Verdugo claimed that U.S. federal agents' warrantless
search of his home in Mexico was a violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights,6 the full contours of the Fourth Amendment-and perhaps the U.S.
Constitution-took the spotlight. Did the Fourth Amendment protect a
1. See Trial Opens in Death of Tortured Drug Agent, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 31, 1988, at 25.
2. Because of the obvious difficulty of counting undocumented immigrants, estimates vary. See,
e.g., JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE
UNITED STATES I (Pew Hispanic Ctr., 2009). See also MICHAEL HOEFER, NANCY RYTINA, & BRYAN C.
BAKER, ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED
STATES: JANUARY 2009 2 (Dep't of Homeland Sec., Office of Immigration Statistics, 2009) (estimating
10.8 million unauthorized immigrants present in January 2009, down from 11.6 million in January
2008).
3. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 262 (1990).
4. Id.
5. There is some evidence that Verdugo was in possession of a valid U.S. resident card at the
time he was apprehended. See David Stewart, The Drug Exception, A.B.A. J., May 1990, at 42, 46.
However, because none of the opinions mention this or rely on this, I ignore that evidence here.
6. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 263.
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Mexican citizen's home from unreasonable search by U.S. agents? Did
Verdugo's presence in the United States matter? Who or what, exactly,
does the Fourth Amendment protect?
Ultimately, the issue would land in the Supreme Court, where the
Court held, in a plurality opinion, that the search at issue was not in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.7 In the Court's opinion,8 Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that the U.S. Constitution did not extend beyond U.S.
borders to protect Verdugo's property in Mexico.9 In response to
Verdugo's argument that he was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection
by virtue of his presence within the United States (where the Constitution
clearly remained in effect), Justice Rehnquist concluded that Verdugo had
not established "substantial connections" with the United States such that
he could claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment: aliens in the
United States only "receive constitutional protections when they have come
within the territory of the United States and developed substantial
connections with this country."' 0
This was the first mention of the term "substantial connections" in
relation to the Fourth Amendment, and commentators could only speculate
as to what that language would mean for the millions of aliens, both
authorized and unauthorized, present in the United States." It seemed that
7. Id. at 274-75.
8. Justices Kennedy, White, O'Connor, and Scalia joined Justice Rehnquist's opinion. See id. at
261. However, because Justice Kennedy's concurrence diverged substantially from the reasoning of the
Court (as described below in this Part II), even rejecting the fundamental line of reasoning employed by
the Court, commentators and courts have referred to the Court's opinion as a plurality opinion. See, e.g.,
Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 835 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that a "plurality of the Court"
subscribed to Justice Rehnquist's definition of "the people"); Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, No. EP-03-
CA-411(KC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2412, *14 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2005) ("Justice Kennedy's
concurrence has caused some to question whether the majority decision is in fact a majority decision in
adopting its definition of 'the people' for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis."); Randall K. Miller,
The Limits of U.S. International Law Enforcement After Verdugo-Urquidez: Resurrecting Rochin, 58
U. PITT. L. REV. 867, 867 n.3 (1997); Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 972
(1991) ("Rehnquist seemed to be really speaking for a plurality of four."); Michael J. Wishnie,
Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 667, 681 (2003) ("Somewhat bafflingly,
Justice Kennedy disagreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis but nonetheless joined the majority
opinion in full, providing the fifth vote for the Court's opinion.").
9. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 268-72 (explaining that prior case law sometimes afforded
constitutional protection to citizens outside of U.S. territory but that there was no authority requiring the
Court to extend constitutional protections to aliens outside of the United States).
10. Id at 271.
11. In addition to the almost twelve million undocumented immigrants in the United States,
another 12.1 million legal permanent residents and millions of nonimmigrant (temporary) alien visitors
to the United States, all of whom would presumably be impacted by Verdugo's reference to "aliens."
See NANCY RYTINA, ESTIMATES OF THE LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION IN 2006 1 (Dep't
of Homeland Sec., Office of Immigration Statistics, 2006). See also RANDALL MONGER & MACREADIE
[Vol. 85:8588
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Verdugo had two faces, and commentators took sides. Some forecasted that
there would be-or at least should be-no change in the way the
Constitution applied to aliens in the United States, arguing that Verdugo
was strictly decided on the basis of geography: Verdugo's searched
property lay outside the United States, putting the search beyond the reach
of the Fourth Amendment.' 2 Others predicted an erosion of Fourth
Amendment rights for aliens in the United States based on the "substantial
connections" language used by the Court.13 After all, never before had the
Court qualified what had previously appeared to be vast constitutional
protection for aliens within United States territory.14  Until Verdugo,
BARR, NONIMMIGRANT ADMISSIONS TO THE UNITED STATES: 2008 1 (Dep't of Homeland Sec., Office
of Immigration Statistics, 2009) (estimating 175 million nonimmigrant admissions in 2008 alone).
12. See, e.g., James G. Connell, III & Rend L. Valladares, Search and Seizure Protections For
Undocumented Aliens: The Territoriality and Voluntary Presence Principles in Fourth Amendment
Law, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1293, 1295 (1997) (characterizing the "substantial connections" test as
"clearly not necessary for the purpose of deciding the narrow issue" of "whether the Fourth Amendment
applies to the search and seizure by United States agents of property that is owned by a nonresident
alien and located in a foreign country" and applying only to the determination of rights outside the
United States); Michael Scaperlanda, The Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights of Aliens: To What
Extent Do They Survive United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez?, 56 Mo. L. REv. 213, 240-41 (1991)
(lamenting that application of the "substantial connections" language test would be a "travesty of
justice" and calling for courts to limit Verdugo as a decision involving foreign policy and extraterritorial
application of U.S. law).
13. See, e.g., Janet E. Mitchell, The Selective Application of the Fourth Amendment: United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 41 CATl. U. L. REv. 289, 318-19 (1991) (arguing that Verdugo "reduces
the reach of the Fourth Amendment" and "ignores ... the values and ideals upon which it is based");
Victor C. Romero, Whatever Happened to the Fourth Amendment?: Undocumented Immigrants' Rights
After INS v. Lopez-Mendoza and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 999, 1003-04
(1992) (warning that Verdugo and Lopez, combined, "expressly curtail Fourth Amendment protections
for undocumented immigrants" and arguing that the cases ignore the normative purpose of the Fourth
Amendment).
14. In fact, the Supreme Court had explicitly and repeatedly afforded aliens constitutional
protections based exclusively on their territorial presence in the United States. See, e.g., Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding that the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment "are
universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality"). See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1982)
(confirming the "territorial theme" of the Equal Protection clause's application to aliens, including
undocumented aliens); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 601 (1953) ("While it may be that a
resident alien's ultimate right to remain in the United States is subject to alteration by statute or
authorized regulation ... , it does not follow that he is thereby deprived of his constitutional right to
procedural due process. His status as a person within the meaning and protection of the Fifth
Amendment cannot be capriciously taken from him."); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770-71
(1950) (suggesting that constitutional protections extend to all those within U.S. territory (but only to
U.S. citizens abroad): "in extending constitutional protections beyond the citizenry, the Court has been
at pains to point out that it was the alien's presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the
Judiciary power to act"); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (holding that four
aliens who had been found unlawfully present in the United States were entitled to indictment and a
jury: "Applying [the reasoning of Yick Wo] to the Fifth and Sixth amendments, it must be concluded
that all persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed by
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commentators and courts had assumed that aliens in the United States,
whether authorized or not, enjoyed many constitutional protections,
including those of the Fourth Amendment,' 5 merely because they were in
the United States. But now the Court suggested that territory was of
reduced importance.
For a decade after the Verdugo decision, it seemed that those who had
dismissed the "substantial connections" language as unlikely to affect
aliens within the United States were largely right. Many courts continued to
assume that aliens within U.S. borders were the beneficiaries of
constitutional rights, either by characterizing the "substantial connections"
test as mere dictum in a divided opinion or by assuming that an alien
voluntarily within the United States automatically had such connections.16
Ten years after its inception, however, the "substantial connections" test
was taking hold, with courts evaluating aliens' affiliations to people and
institutions within the United States as a prerequisite for the assertion of a
Fourth Amendment claim.1
those amendments.").
15. In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court itself had expressly suggested that the Fourth
Amendment applied to undocumented immigrants within the United States. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,
468 U.S. 1032 (1984). There, the Court considered whether the exclusionary rule, under which evidence
gathered during an unconstitutional search is inadmissible, applied in deportation proceedings.
Although the Court concluded that the exclusionary rule did not apply to deportation proceedings
because they are civil, rather than criminal, proceedings, id. at 1038, eight of the nine Justices took the
position that undocumented immigrants nonetheless were protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id at
1050 ("We do not condone any violations of the Fourth Amendment that may have occurred in the
arrests of [the defendants] .... Our conclusions concerning the exclusionary rule's value might change,
if there developed good reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers were
widespread."). See also id. at 1051 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 1055 (White, J., joined by Stevens,
J., dissenting); id. at 1060 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In fact, even the Immigration and Naturalization
Service ("INS"), represented by the Solicitor General, assumed that illegal aliens are covered under the
Fourth Amendment. See Brief for Petitioner at 10, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (No.
83-491) ("The determinative question, therefore, is not whether the protections of the Fourth
Amendment extend to deportable aliens discovered in this country-a proposition we do not contest-
but whether it is appropriate to permit illegal aliens to invoke the exclusionary rule in civil deportation
proceedings .... ). See also United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Once aliens
become subject to liability under United States law, they also have the right to benefit from [Fourth
Amendment] protection.").
16. See, e.g., United States v. Guitterez, 983 F. Supp. 905, 915 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (stating that
there is no obligation to prove substantial connections to the country in order for an alien to receive
Fourth Amendment protections), rev'd on other grounds, 203 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished
opinion); United States v. Iribe, 806 F. Supp. 917, 919 (D. Colo. 1992) (rejecting the substantial
connection test for application of constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 11 F.3d 1553 (10th Cir. 1993).
17. See, e.g, Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 625 (5th Cir. 2006) (declining to
determine whether Verdugo's substantial connection language is controlling precedent, but finding that
defendant, an excludable alien, had sufficient connections to the U.S. for purposes of the Verdugo test
INSIDE THE BORDER, OUTSIDE THE LAW
Harder to predict, however, was that Verdugo would lead some courts
to find that certain undocumented immigrants are categorically outside the
protection of the Fourth Amendment, regardless of ties to the surrounding
community.'s A federal district court in Utah took that very position in
United States v. Esparza-Mendoza when it held that previously deported
alien felons are categorically barred from Fourth Amendment rights.19
Other courts subsequently adopted the reasoning in Esparza-Mendoza, and
one court applying Verdugo's "substantial connections" test held that an
alien may establish connections to the United States only upon lawfully
crossing its borders.20
In effect, Verdugo has become a wild card of sorts; it takes on a new
identity each time it is played. In the hands of some courts and
commentators, Verdugo stands for the proposition that territory is the
ultimate determinant of constitutional rights. For others, it represents a
move away from a territory-based model and toward an approach that
values human connections and ties. Still others, however, find support in
Verdugo for an approach that affords protections only to those with legal
status, regardless of their presence within or ties to the United States.
On a more abstract level, Verdugo's multiple incarnations serve as a
useful case study in the evolution of membership theory in the United
States, especially as it affects undocumented immigrants. Membership, or
the concept of belonging, is a familiar idea that we encounter on a daily
basis; much of our human ordering of the world relies on sorting members
from nonmembers.2 We routinely allocate privileges on the basis of
membership: fitness club members enjoy the privilege of using the club's
by virtue of her prior entries into the United States); United States v. Atienzo, No. 2:04-CR-00534,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31652, at *14-18 (D. Utah Dec. 6, 2005) (holding that an undocumented
immigrant who had been employed, paid taxes, and had family within the United States had sufficient
connections to the United States).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Gutierrez-Casada, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1272 (D. Kan. 2008)
(holding that a previously deported alien felon is "not entitled to the same Fourth Amendment
protections as [are] ordinary citizens"); United States v. Ullah, No. 04-CR-30A(F), 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12419, at *99 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2005) ("[I]t is only upon 'lawfully' entering the United
States that an alien may begin to establish the substantial connections necessary .... ); United States v.
Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1271 (D. Utah 2003) ("[A]n individual previously deported
alien felon is not free to argue that, in his particular case, he possesses a sufficient connection to this
country to receive Fourth Amendment coverage (unless, of course, he could prove he was in this
country lawfully)."), aff'don other grounds, 386 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 2004).
19. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.
20. Ullah, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12419, at *99.
21. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAw 7 (1996); Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of
Immigrants, 8 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 389, 396 (2007).
2011] 91
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
fitness equipment, and food co-op members have the right to buy co-op
food at discounted prices. As I explain in this Article, legal rights,
including Fourth Amendment rights, are likewise privileges of membership
or belonging.22 Just as the use of fitness club equipment is a privilege of
membership in that club, the right against unreasonable search and seizure
is a privilege of membership in another, more amorphous, "club." Because
determining who is a member is as much about exclusion as it is about
inclusion23 -after all, it is the fact that not everyone can be a member that
makes membership desirable-how to determine who is a member is a
volatile issue for courts and legislatures. The question of who gets Fourth
Amendment protection is no exception, and the varying approaches to
Verdugo (as well as the sharp division in the Supreme Court's opinion)
evidence the controversy inherent in sorting members from nonmembers.
My purpose in this Article is to analyze Verdugo and its progeny in
the context of membership theory. While scholars have deconstructed and
analyzed Verdugo and its predecessors to predict lower court reactions to
its "substantial connections" test, here I use hindsight to plot Verdugo and
its progeny onto the broader trajectory of U.S. courts' development and
incorporation of membership theory in U.S. law. I argue that the Supreme
Court's opinion in Verdugo, when analyzed in the context of cases about
the meaning and significance of territorial presence, is a pivotal alienage
law24 decision evidencing a trend in membership theory. Verdugo rejects
the use of territorial presence as an indicator of membership in favor of
looking directly at the characteristics that suggest belonging to the
community, including community ties. In that sense, Verdugo is a
paradigmatic example of what I have elsewhere called a "post-territorial"
approach25 to membership that distributes rights according to more
fundamental indicators of membership, including an individual's ties to the
surrounding community and her sense of obligation to the United States.
Verdugo strips the membership inquiry of the preoccupation with
geography because territorial presence is no longer an adequate proxy for
these substantive indicators of membership. However, Verdugo preserves
22. In fact, this is exactly what the Court in Verdugo was trying to determine when it analyzed
whether the term "people" in the Fourth Amendment's text included aliens.
23. Bosniak, supra note 21, at 396.
24. By "alienage law," I refer to the body of law (outside of immigration and naturalization law)
governing foreign nationals on U.S. soil. Alienage law encompasses the distribution of benefits and
rights to, as well as the obligations imposed upon, aliens in the U.S. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership,
Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1047, 1087 (1994) (describing
alienage law as "law governing the treatment of aliens in the United States").
25. D. Carolina Nifiez, Fractured Membership: Deconstructing Territoriality to Secure Rights
and Remedies for the Undocumented Worker, 2010 Wis. L. REv. 817, 870 (2010).
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an interest in the factors that territorial presence once represented.
I contend that the lower courts that have relied on Verdugo to
categorically deny certain classes of undocumented immigrants the
protections of the Fourth Amendment have unwittingly and inappropriately
reverted to a proxy -legal status-to evaluate membership and belonging
in the United States. That is, the very notion rejected by Verdugo-that a
single proxy can adequately account for the complex idea of belonging-
underlies these status-based decisions. Moreover, these courts have
misinterpreted Verdugo as a complete rejection of territoriality as a
membership model, when, in reality, Verdugo preserves the underlying
rationales of territoriality.
Not only is a categorical bar on the assertion of Fourth Amendment
rights a gross misapplication of Verdugo, but it also illustrates the pitfalls
courts are likely to encounter in other areas of alienage law as U.S. law
increasingly moves from a territory-dominated membership approach to a
more principled post-territorial approach. In fact, this dynamic of courts
adopting legal status as a new proxy for membership is materializing in
other contexts, including labor and employment law,2 6 tort law,27 and
education law, 28 where undocumented immigrants are increasingly finding
that status forecloses access to privileges and benefits. This trend highlights
the need for courts, legislatures, and commentators to recognize that while
territorial presence may no longer be an adequate proxy for membership, a
rejection of territoriality need not be a de facto adoption of an approach that
values legal status over community ties and mutuality of obligation, among
26. See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151-52 (2002) (holding
that undocumented workers may not recover backpay-wages for work that would have been
performed if the employee had not been illegally terminated-in a claim under the National Labor
Relations Act).
27. See, e.g., Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 1000 (N.H. 2005) (holding that
because "an illegal alien may not recover lost United States earnings," immigration status is relevant to
a claim of lost earnings in a tort case).
28. A recent Arizona state senate proposal-SB 1611-to ban undocumented immigrants from
state universities and community colleges, as well as the rhetoric surrounding the opposition of the
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors ("DREAM") Act are examples of this dynamic.
S.B. 1611, 50th Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011). See also Memorandum from Alison P. Landry,
Assistant Att'y Gen. of Va., to Presidents, Chancellor, Rectors, Registrars, Admissions Dirs., Domicile
Officers, and Foreign Student Advisors, and the Executive Dir., State Council for Higher Educ. In Va.
(Sept. 5, 2002), available at http://www.schev.edu/AdminFaculty/ImmigrationMemo9-5-02APL.pdf
(opining that "Illegal or undocumented aliens should not be enrolled in Virginia public institutions of
higher education"). But see California AB 131, the "California Dream Act," which makes
undocumented immigrants eligible for financial aid to state universities and colleges. Patrick McGreevy
& Anthony York, Gov. Jerry Brown Signs Dream Act for State's Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (Oct.
8, 2011, 12:27 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/califonmia-politics/2011/10/gov-jerry-brown-
announces-he-has-signed-bill-allowing-illegal-immigrants-access-to-college-aid.html.
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other things. Rather, the inadequacy of territorial presence and status as
proxies for membership stems from their inability to account for the
complexity of membership and belonging. Ultimately, I argue that, in order
for the realm of Fourth Amendment law to coincide with Verdugo's
directive and the broader trajectory of U.S. membership theory, Fourth
Amendment rights should be allocated to undocumented immigrants with
direct reference to their membership in the United States, rather than
through evaluation of inadequate proxies such as territorial presence or
legal status.
To reach my conclusions, I begin in Part II with a summary of
Verdugo, as well as scholars' reactions to the "substantial connections"
test. Then I discuss the effects of Verdugo on the lower court adjudication
of undocumented immigrants' Fourth Amendment claims, using several
cases to illustrate the three general approaches to Fourth'Amendment rights
that have developed from Verdugo. I especially focus on several courts that
have used Verdugo's "substantial connections" test to decide that
undocumented immigrants (or at least certain classes of undocumented
immigrants) are, as a rule, outside the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Part III analyzes Verdugo and its progeny under the lens of
membership theory. First, I briefly introduce the concept of membership
and the various approaches to membership identifiable in U.S. law,
including the territorial and status-based approaches. I illustrate how these
approaches manifest themselves in current U.S. law and then categorize the
various interpretations of Verdugo into each of the three membership
approaches. I then plot Verdugo on a membership theory trajectory to show
that Verdugo is a pivotal case in the movement toward a post-territorial
approach.
Verdugo marks a weakening in the traditional territorial approach to
membership. By requiring an alien within the country to have "substantial
connections" to the United States, the Court rejected the notion that
territory serves as an adequate indicator of membership and pushed Fourth
Amendment law toward a post-territorial model. Although that may not
have been apparent to courts and commentators interpreting Verdugo
immediately after the Supreme Court issued its decision, a bird's eye view
of Verdugo's predecessors and subsequent Supreme Court developments,
confirms Verdugo's pivotal role in the trend toward a rejection of strict
territoriality and a move toward post-territoriality.
In Part IV, I argue that courts employing the "substantial connections"
test to categorically deny undocumented immigrants' Fourth Amendment
94 [Vol. 85:85
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rights have allowed a status-based approach to displace the post-territorial
approach identifiable in Verdugo. In effect, those courts have filled the
vacuum left behind by the Supreme Court's abandonment of a predictable,
easily applied territory-based rule with a new status-based bright line rule
that violates Verdugo's underlying principles.
Part V concludes this Article by calling on commentators, courts, and
legislators to recognize the trend toward post-territoriality and prevent the
encroachment of a status-based approach into the distribution of
membership rights.
II. THE SURPRISINGLY PLIABLE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Verdugo is only one of many criminal cases that sprung out of the
highly publicized murder of Enrique Camarena, a U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration ("DEA") agent working undercover in Guadalajara,
Mexico, to unearth the operations of a drug trafficking organization led by
Rafael Caro Quintero.29 Camarena had successfully helped Mexican
authorities locate and destroy over 10,000 tons of marijuana owned by the
drug trafficking ring.30 On February 7, 1985, Camarena was kidnapped and
never seen nor heard from until his tortured body was discovered a month
later.31 A former U.S. Marine, firefighter, and police officer, Camarena
enjoyed widespread respect within the DEA and had received several
awards during his eleven-year service there.32 Camarena's murder sparked
public outrage and launched the largest homicide investigation ever
undertaken by the DEA.33 Against a backdrop of already strained relations
between the United States and Mexico resulting from Mexican officials'
lack of cooperation in the investigation, 34 U.S. investigators claimed that
Mexican law enforcement officials had been involved in Camarena's
death.3 5 U.S. investigators encountered continued resistance to their
investigation of the crime and ultimately gained custody of two suspects,
29. Philip Shenon, U.S. Charges 9 in Mexico Death of a Drug Agent, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1988,
at Al.
30. Id.
3 1. Id.
32. Biographies of DEA Agents and Employees Killed in Action, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMIN., http://www.justice.gov/dealagency/10bios.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
33. Id.
34. Interview by PBS Frontline with Jack Lawn, Former Adm'r, DEA (2000), available at
http.//www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/interviews/lawn.html#kiki.
35. See Central Figure is Convicted in '85 Killing of Drug Agent, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1990 at
AIO [hereinafter Central Figure Convicted]. DEA investigators also believed a brother-in-law of former
Mexican president Luis Echeverria Alvarez had been involved. Id
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Rend Martin Verdugo Urquidez 36 and Humberto Alvarez Machain,37 only
after bounty hunters and Mexican police officers abducted the suspects and
delivered them to U.S. Marshalls at the U.S. border.38
After U.S. officials placed Verdugo in a California correctional center,
the DEA conducted searches of Verdugo's homes in Mexico and seized
incriminating documents, including a tally sheet cataloguing the shipments
of marijuana Verdugo had smuggled into the United States. 9 At trial,
Verdugo moved for the suppression of the documents found during the
search on the basis that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment. 4 0 The issue was a novel one that straddled two very different
areas of law. On one hand, the location of the search outside United States
borders suggested that this was a question of the extraterritorial application
of the U.S. Constitution. On the other hand, since Verdugo was now being
held and tried in the United States, the question seemed to implicate the
constitutional rights of aliens in the United States.
A. FORMULATING THE ISSUE
As any first-year law student knows, the way an issue is framed may
have a significant impact on the outcome of the case. More importantly, in
Verdugo, the framing of the issue would have a significant impact on the
case's future applicability. When Verdugo reached the Ninth Circuit, a
divided panel took a bifurcated approach to formulating the issue. 41 First,
the court analyzed the extraterritorial applicability of the Fourth
Amendment, determining that the U.S. Constitution applied whenever the
U.S. government acted abroad.42 The government, the Ninth Circuit
36. Investigators believed Verdugo was Quintero's "top lieutenant" in the drug ring. Shenon,
supra note 29.
37. Alvarez was a Mexican doctor suspected of aiding in Camarena's torture. Philip Shenon,
US. Says It Won't Return Mexican Doctor Linked to Drug Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1990,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/21/world/us-says-it-won-t-return-mexican-doctor-linked-
to-drug-killing.html.
38. See Central Figure Convicted, supra note 35; United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 262 (1990). The abduction of the two suspects drew criticism from Mexican officials, with the
president of Mexico threatening to end Mexico's cooperation in anti-drug efforts. Central Figure
Convicted, supra note 35.
39. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 262-63.
40. Id. at 263.
41. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd 494 U.S. 259
(1990).
42. Id. at 1218. The Ninth Circuit relied on Reid v. Covert, in which the Supreme Court had held
that two U.S. citizens living abroad and convicted by a U.S. military court for the murder of their
husbands were protected by the Bill of Rights and enjoyed the right to a trial by jury after indictment by
a grand jury. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957). During the government's appeal of the grant
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reasoned, could only act to the extent permitted by the Constitution. 4 Thus,
if the government reached across territorial boundaries to punish a citizen
abroad, the Bill of Rights must limit the government in its actions.4
Second, the court addressed the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment to aliens within United States territory.45 Drawing on Supreme
Court precedent that had explicitly extended constitutional protections to
aliens based solely on their presence within U.S. boundaries,4 6 the court
held that an alien within the United States enjoys the same Fourth
Amendment rights that citizens do.47 With both lines of reasoning leading
to the same conclusion, the Ninth Circuit held that Verdugo was indeed
protected by the Fourth Amendment and affirmed the trial court's grant of
his motion to exclude the evidence at issue.48
Notably, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion relied heavily on the Supreme
Court's opinion in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, in which a majority of the
Supreme Court assumed that the Fourth Amendment applied to
undocumented aliens within U.S. territory.49 In Lopez-Mendoza, the
Supreme Court faced the question of whether the exclusionary rule, which
allows trial courts to exclude evidence derived from an illegal search or
seizure, applied in deportation proceedings.s5  Although the Court
ultimately decided that the exclusionary rule did not apply to deportation
proceedings because they are civil (rather than criminal) proceedings in
which a cost-benefit analysis weighs against the application of the rule, the
of Verdugo's motion, the Supreme Court would later distinguish Reid on the basis that it extended
constitutional rights to citizens abroad, not aliens. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 270.
43. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1218 (stating that "From these cases, a proposition of
enormous vitality may be drawn: The Constitution imposes substantive constraints on the federal
government, even when it operates abroad.").
44. Id.
45. Id ("Having concluded that the Constitution limits the government's authority when it acts
abroad, we must address the key question in this case: May a nonresident alien challenge the
reasonableness of the federal government's actions under the fourth amendment?").
46. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211 (1982) (finding that under the Fourteenth
Amendment, undocumented immigrant children are entitled to the same free public education that
citizen children are entitled to); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (confirming the applicability
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to all aliens within the United States); Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (extending the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment to "all
persons within the territory of the United States"); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)
(holding that aliens within the United States are entitled to the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment by virtue of territorial presence: its "provisions are universal in their application, to all
persons within the territorial jurisdiction [of the United States]").
47. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1218.
48. Id. at 1230.
49. See id. at 1223.
50. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984).
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Court suggested that undocumented immigrants are nonetheless protected
by the Fourth Amendment.5 Specifically, the Court's plurality decision
lamented any violation of the undocumented immigrant claimants' Fourth
Amendment rights and implied that the result in Lopez-Mendoza might
have differed if the Fourth Amendment violations at issue had been more
pervasive. 52 In addition, four dissenting justices expressly opined that
undocumented immigrants enjoy Fourth Amendment rights, and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"), represented by the
Solicitor General, joined in that sentiment.54
On appeal of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Verdugo," Justice
Rehnquist, writing for a plurality of the Court,56 dismissed Lopez-
Mendoza's implied recognition of Fourth Amendment rights for the
undocumented as an unlitigated and undecided issue with no bearing on the
outcome of Verdugo's motion.5 7 The Court then treated each of the Ninth
Circuit's arguments-that the Fourth Amendment applies abroad and that
51. Id. at 1038-39.
52. See id. at 1050 ("We do not condone any violations of the Fourth Amendment that may have
occurred in the arrests of respondents .... Our conclusions concerning the exclusionary rule's value
might change, if there developed good reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations by INS
officers were widespread.").
53. See id at 1051 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 1055 (White, J., joined by Stevens, J.,
dissenting); id. at 1060 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The assumption that all aliens within the United States
enjoy Fourth Amendment rights was widespread. See United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 110 (5th
Cir. 1979) ("Once aliens become subject to liability under United States law, they also have the right to
benefit from [Fourth Amendment] protection."); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273
(1973) ("In the absence of probable cause or consent, [the] search violated the petitioner's Fourth
Amendment right to be free of 'unreasonable searches and seizures.' It is not enough to argue, as does
the Government, that the problem of deterring unlawful entry by aliens across long expanses of national
boundaries is a serious one."); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 237 (1960) ("Searches for evidence
of crime present situations demanding the greatest, not the least, restraint upon the Government's
intrusion into privacy; . .. it was at these searches which the Fourth Amendment was primarily directed.
We conclude, therefore, that government officers who effect a deportation arrest have a right of
incidental search analogous to the search permitted criminal law-enforcement officers.").
54. Brief for Petitioner at 10, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (No. 83-491) ("The
determinative question, therefore, is not whether the protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to
deportable aliens discovered in this country-a proposition we do not contest-but whether it is
appropriate to permit illegal aliens to invoke the exclusionary rule in civil deportation
proceedings. . . .").
55. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
56. See supra note 8.
57. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272 ("The question presented for decision in Lopez-Mendoza
was limited to whether the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule should be extended to civil
deportation proceedings; it did not encompass whether the protections of the Fourth Amendment extend
to illegal aliens in this country."). For a critique of the Verdugo Court's abandonment of the implied
recognition of Fourth Amendment rights in Lopez-Mendoza, see Stella Burch Elias, "Good Reason to
Believe ": Widespread Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the
Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REv. 1109, 1151-53 (2008).
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aliens in the United States are entitled to the protections of the Fourth
Amendment-separately.
With respect to the extraterritorial application of the Constitution, the
plurality rejected the Ninth Circuit's statement that the United States is
bound by the Constitution wherever and whenever it acts, even
extraterritorially." Justice Rehnquist placed great weight on the Insular
Cases,9 a series of decisions in which the Supreme Court limited the
application of the Constitution in unincorporated territories of the United
States.60 If the Constitution's application is limited in territories owned and
governed by the United States, Justice Rehnquist argued, "respondent's
claim that the protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to aliens in
foreign nations is even weaker. And certainly, it is not open to us in light of
the Insular Cases to endorse the view that every constitutional provision
applies wherever the United States Government exercises its power." 6 1 In
essence, if the Constitution did not follow the U.S. flag, 62 it certainly did
not follow the Mexican flag.
With respect to the question of whether Verdugo, by virtue of his
forced presence in the United States, enjoyed Fourth Amendment
protections, Justice Rehnquist concluded that he did not.63 Beginning with
a textual analysis of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Rehnquist noted that it
safeguards the "right of the people to be secure .. . against unreasonable
searches and seizures" as opposed to "persons," as used in many other parts
of the Constitution.64 For Justice Rehnquist, this difference suggested that
the individuals protected by the Fourth Amendment are members of a
"class of persons who are part of a national community or who have
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
58. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 267-69.
59. Id at 268. See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (declining to extend Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial to Puerto Rico); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914) (no Fifth
Amendment right to grand jury in the Philippines); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (jury
trials not guaranteed in the Philippines); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (no right to
indictment by grand jury or jury trial in Hawaii). For an examination of the Insular Cases, see Pedro A.
Malavet, The Inconvenience ofa "Constitution [that] Follows the Flag . .. But Doesn't Quite Catch Up
with It" from Downes v. Bidwell to Boumediene v. Bush, 80 Miss. L.J. 181 (2010).
60. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 268.
61. Id. at 268-69.
62. For an interesting discussion of the situations in which the Constitution "follows the flag"
extraterritorially, see KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? (2009).
63. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271.
64. Id. at 265 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV) (distinguishing the Fourth
Amendment's use of the term "the people" from the Fifth and Sixth Amendments' use of the word
"person" and "accused").
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considered part of that community." 65
When Verdugo argued that the Supreme Court had previously
explicitly granted aliens broad constitutional protection by virtue of their
territorial presence within the United States, Justice Rehnquist dismissed
the cases as standing for the unremarkable proposition that "aliens receive
constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the
United States and developed substantial connections with the country." 66
Verdugo, Justice Rehnquist argued, had no such connections. 67
Justices Kennedy and Stevens concurred in the judgment but wrote
separately to note some important disagreements with Justice Rehnquist's
reasoning. Justice Kennedy took issue with Justice Rehnquist's reliance on
the term "the people" in the Fourth Amendment as a way to restrict its
protections. Rather, he argued, the applicability of the Fourth Amendment
in the realm of foreign relations depends on the practicability of enforcing
it.68 Notably, Justice Kennedy opined that the same search within the
United States would undoubtedly be covered by the Fourth Amendment.69
Justice Stevens wrote separately to note that aliens lawfully within U.S.
borders are among "the people" covered by the Fourth Amendment and
that Verdugo, having been brought into the United States by government
officials, was legally within U.S. territory." He reserved the question of
65. Id at 265.
66. Id. at 271. Verdugo pointed to a line of cases that had based the protection of aliens within
the United States exclusively on their territorial presence (rather than their status as legal or illegal
aliens or permanent or temporary residents) within the United States. Scholars have referred to this
territorial approach to constitutional rights as the "Yick Wo tradition" after the first in this line of cases,
in which the Supreme Court applied the Fourteenth Amendment to protect a resident alien, reasoning
that the Fourteenth Amendment's protections "are universal in their application, to all persons within
the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1982)
(confirming the "territorial theme" of the Equal Protection Clause's application to aliens, including
undocumented aliens); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 601 (1953) ("While it may be that a
resident alien's ultimate right to remain in the United States is subject to alteration by statute or
authorized regulation ... ,it does not follow that he is thereby deprived of his constitutional right to
procedural due process. His status as a person within the meaning and protection of the Fifth
Amendment cannot be capriciously taken from him."). Interestingly, Justice Rehnquist forfeited the
opportunity to distinguish these cases based on the constitutional provisions being applied. None of the
cases cited implicates the Fourth Amendment; in fact, Yick Wo and its progeny almost exclusively apply
provisions that explicitly protect "persons" rather than "the people," a distinction Justice Rehnquist had
already found meaningful. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
67. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271.
68. Id. at 278 ("The conditions and considerations of this case would make adherence to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement impracticable and anomalous.").
69. Id. ("If the search had occurred in a residence within the United States, I have little doubt that
the full protections of the Fourth Amendment would apply.").
70. Id. at 279.
INSIDE THE BORDER, OUTSIDE THE LAW
whether undocumented immigrants within the United States would
likewise be protected.71 Justice Stevens nonetheless joined the Court's
judgment because he opined that the search was not "unreasonable" and
therefore not violative of the Fourth Amendment.72
Three Justices dissented. Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice
Stevens' conclusion that Verdugo was within the United States legally and
therefore entitled to Fourth Amendment protections, but he would have
remanded the case for further proceedings on the question of whether the
search was reasonable. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented from the
judgment on the basis that U.S. law did not require "substantial
connections" to the U.S. in order for the Fourth Amendment to attach, apd,
in any event, Verdugo had such connections by virtue of the United States'
investigation and prosecution for violations of U.S. law. 74 The United
States, the dissenters argued, could not impose its obligations on Verdugo
without also extending its constitutional protections.75
B. VERDUGO'S THREE INCARNATIONS
Given the bifurcated approach the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme
Court plurality took in determining whether Verdugo possessed Fourth
Amendment rights-each court analyzed separately the questions of
whether the Fourth Amendment applied extraterritorially and whether the
Fourth Amendment applied to aliens within the United States-subsequent
court decisions and scholarship diverge on Verdugo's ultimate meaning. Of
course, the Supreme Court's sharply divided opinion only compounds the
seeming discrepancies in its reasoning. Speaking broadly, the cases
discussing Verdugo's applicability to the rights of aliens within the United
States fall into three categories: (1) cases that find Verdugo irrelevant to the
rights of aliens within the United States; (2) cases interpreting Verdugo to
require a case-by-case analysis of an alien's "substantial connections" to
the United States before applying the Fourth Amendment; and (3) cases
that use Verdugo to hold that certain classes of undocumented immigrants
are categorically excluded from Fourth Amendment protection regardless
71. Id. at 279 n. *.
72. He further argued that the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable to
"searches of noncitizens' homes in foreign jurisdictions because American magistrates have no power
to authorize such searches." Id. at 279.
73. Id. at 297-98.
74. Id. at 283 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) ("What the majority ignores,
however, is the most obvious connection between Verdugo-Urquidez and the United States.. . .The
'sufficient connection' is supplied not by Verdugo-Urquidez, but by the Government.")
75. See id.
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of any alleged connection to the United States.
1. Verdugo as Irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment Rights of Aliens Within
the United States
Verdugo practically invites courts and commentators to treat it as
bearing only on the Fourth Amendment's application to extraterritorial
searches by the U.S. government and wholly irrelevant to the rights of
aliens within the United States. The lack of consensus on the Court, the
seemingly superfluous reference to Verdugo's presence within the United
States, and the difficulty of applying a test that measures an individual's
connections to the United States all weigh in favor of characterizing
Verdugo as . a case about the Fourth Amendment's extraterritorial
application rather than about immigrants' Fourth Amendment rights.
First, it is easy to dismiss Verdugo's "substantial connections" test
based on its failure to garner the support of a majority of the Justices. Only
four of nine Justices appear to have agreed with Justice Rehnquist's
"substantial connections" language. 76 Justice Kennedy, who concurred in
the judgment, rejected Justice Rehnquist's attempt to limit application of
the Fourth Amendment based on the Amendment's use of the term "the
people." Justice Kennedy opined that if the search at issue in Verdugo had
occurred in the United States, it would have been covered under the Fourth
Amendment.77 Justice Kennedy's concurrence is therefore difficult to
reconcile with the Court's suggestion that only aliens with "substantial
connections" to the United States can be classified as one of "the people"
of the United States. 78
Characterizing the "substantial connections" language as the dicta of a
minority of Justices, some courts and commentators have refused to apply
that test to limit the rights of aliens in the United States 79 or instead find
that language to be persuasive, rather than controlling.80 Others have
refused to decide whether Verdugo's "substantial connections" test
governs, choosing to deny motions for exclusion of evidence on other
76. See supra note 8.
77. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 273.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Guitterez, 983 F. Supp. 905, 915 (N.D. Cal. 1998) ("It is also
noteworthy that a majority of the justices did not subscribe to Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion,
particularly with respect to his discussion and analysis regarding the scope of the Fourth Amendment as
it applies to illegal aliens."), rev'd on other grounds, 203 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished
opinion).
80. See, e.g., Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, No. EP-03-CA-41 1(KC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2412, at *16 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2005), af'd, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006).
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grounds or finding that the claimant would have satisfied the substantial
connections test if it were indeed controlling."' In a Bivens claim under the
Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Circuit declined to decide whether the
"substantial connections" language is valid precedent, finding that even if
the Verdugo test were controlling, the claimant had sufficient connections
to meet that test.82 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit avoided the question of
Verdugo's precedential value by holding that the search at issue in Barona
could not be considered violative of the Fourth Amendment even if the
claimant could have shown substantial connections to the United States.83
Second, the judgment in Verdugo arguably rested (or at least could
have rested) exclusively on the location of Verdugo's residences outside
U.S. territory. According to this argument, Verdugo is a case about the
extraterritorial application of the Constitution rather than the rights of
aliens within U.S. territory. 84 This certainly seems plausible in light of
Justice Rehnquist's insistence that a Fourth Amendment violation is
complete upon conclusion of the allegedly unreasonable search: "For
purposes of this case, therefore, if there were a constitutional violation, it
occurred solely in Mexico."85 Verdugo's right to exclude evidence gained
from the allegedly illegal search during his U.S. trial within U.S. territory
was merely a remedy for a possible Fourth Amendment violation, rather
than a constitutional question in itself; thus, only the search's location (not
Verdugo's location)86 was relevant. 87 In that sense, the only question at
81. See id. See also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 624-25 (5th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 1995).
82. Martinez-Aguero, 459 F.3d at 625 ("We need not decide whether Verdugo-Urquidez is
controlling, because even under the more demanding test, Martinez-Aguero has 'developed substantial
connections with the country' and earned the protection of the Fourth Amendment."). There, the
claimant had entered the United States on an invalid border-crossing pass on the erroneous advice of an
immigration officer. Id at 620. The claimant had entered the United States several times before on a
valid visa to accompany her aunt to the nearest U.S. Social Security office. Id These contacts, the Fifth
Circuit explained, would have been sufficient to meet the "substantial connections" test. Id. at 625.
Interestingly, the court in various places in the opinion framed the issue as one of standing. See, e.g., id.
at 624 ("We turn now to whether she has standing under the Fourth Amendment."). For a discussion
tracking courts' adoption of the "substantial connections" test as requirement of standing, see Jeffrey
Kahn, Zoya's Standing Problem, or, When Should the Constitution Follow the Flag?, 108 MICH. L.
REv. 673 (2010).
83. See Barona, 56 F.3d at 1094 ("We could hold, therefore, that [the claimants] have failed to
demonstrate that, at the time of the extraterritorial search, they were 'People of the United States'
entitled to receive [Constitutional protection] . ... We choose, however, not to reach the question
because even if they were entitled to invoke the Fourth Amendment, their effort would be
unsuccessful.").
84. See Connell & Valladares, supra note 12, at 1295 (characterizing the "substantial
connections" language, at least as it applied to aliens in the United States, as dicta).
85. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990).
86. Although the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, location is still an important
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issue in Verdugo was whether property outside of the United States and
belonging to an alien is protected under the Fourth Amendment, not
whether aliens (documented or not) enjoy the Amendment's protections. In
fact, that is precisely how the plurality characterized the issue at one point
in the decision.88
Using this second argument, courts have dismissed Verdugo as
irrelevant to an undocumented immigrant's motion to exclude evidence
allegedly derived from an illegal search.89 A district court in Colorado
refused to analyze whether undocumented immigrant defendants bore
"substantial connection" to the United States, arguing that "The broad
language of the Chief Justice was not required for the holding and was not
joined by the majority of the justices." 90 The question before it, the court
contended, bore no relation to Verdugo's actual holding: "This is not an
extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment." 91 A district court in
Texas echoed this reasoning: "[the present decision] does not involve the
Fourth Amendment rights of those aliens physically located either legally
or illegally within sovereign United States territory. As such, the facts of
the decision alone may limit the potential relevancy of Verdugo-
Urquidez."92
factor to consider in Fourth Amendment analysis. See Connell & Valladares, supra note 12, at 1311
("The location-specific nature of the Fourth Amendment violations is based on the language of the
amendment, which prohibits 'unreasonable searches and [seizures]'per se, rather than the use of tainted
evidence at trial.").
87. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354
(1974)) ("Whether evidence obtained from respondent's Mexican residences should be excluded at trial
in the United States is a remedial question separate from the existence vel non of the constitutional
violation."). See also Calandra, 514 U.S. at 354 ("The wrong condemned is the unjustified
governmental invasion of these areas of an individual's life. That wrong, committed in this case, is fully
accomplished by the original search without probable cause .... Questions based on illegally obtained
evidence .... work no new Fourth Amendment wrong.").
88. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 261 (framing the issue as "whether the Fourth Amendment
applies to the search and seizure by United States agents of property that is owned by a nonresident
alien and located in a foreign country").
89. See, e.g., United States v. Iribe, 806 F. Supp. 917, 919 (D. Colo. 1992), rev'd in part on other
grounds, aff'd in part, 11 F.3d 1553 (10th Cir. 1993).
90. Iribe, 806 F. Supp at 919. See also United States v. Medina-Ortega, No. CRIM.A. 20094-
KHV, 2000 WL 1469314, at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 25, 2000) (characterizing Verdugo as holding that "non-
resident illegal aliens in foreign countries do not have constitutional rights" and assuming "without
deciding that defendant [an undocumented immigrant] has standing to challenge the search under the
Fourth Amendment").
91. Iribe, 806 F. Supp. at 919.
92. Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, No. EP-03-CA-41 l(KC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2412, at
*12-13 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2005), af'd, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006). Ultimately, the appellate court in
Martinez-Aguero proceeded to apply the "substantial connections" test to the undocumented immigrant
at issue, finding that her prior legal crossings into the United States, as well as her good faith (although
misguided) efforts to comply with U.S. in obtaining what she believed were subsequent legal entries,
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Third, the plurality's vague language arguably gives courts
insufficient direction in determining exactly who belongs to the class of
persons identified in the Fourth Amendment's mention of "the people."
Courts have, on this basis, declined to apply the "substantial connections"
test to limit the rights of aliens that have experienced alleged Fourth
Amendment violations within the United States. 93 Proceeding without
further guidance, one court has argued, would be tantamount to "divin[ing]
a rule." 94 Indeed, commentators have criticized the Verdugo plurality
opinion for its broad and impractical language.95
The potential difficulty of applying Verdugo's vague "substantial
connections" test, combined with the divided opinions and complicated
reasoning of the court, renders Verdugo an easily dismissible opinion.
2. Verdugo as Requiring Individual Analysis of Aliens' Fourth
Amendment Rights
Despite the difficulty of applying Verdugo's substantial connections
test and the division among the Justices, some courts have declined to
second-guess the opinion of the Court, taking at "face value the fact that
Justice Kennedy joined the opinion of the Court."96 These courts interpret
the Verdugo plurality opinion's discussion of Verdugo's presence within
the United States as imposing a new requirement, beyond mere territorial
presence, for aliens claiming Fourth Amendment rights. The contours of
this new requirement, though, are largely undefined, and courts have
were sufficient. Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 625 (5th Cir. 2006). See also United
States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 251 (9th Cir. 1990) (characterizing Verdugo as a case about
extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment: "[Verdugo] only held that the fourth amendment
does not apply to searches and seizures of nonresident aliens in foreign countries").
93. See, e.g., United States v. Guitterez, 983 F. Supp. 905, 916 (N.D. Cal. 1998) ("Given the lack
of any clear appellate guidance which alters the applicable standard or otherwise sets forth a definitive
analysis in making these vital determinations, the Court is disinclined to impose a greater burden on this
category of criminal defendants as a prerequisite to seeking the shelter of the Fourth Amendment."),
rev'd on other grounds, 203 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished opinion).
94. Id. at 915.
95. See, e.g., Randall K. Miller, The Limits of U.S. International Law Enforcement After
Verdugo-Urquidez: Resurrecting Rochin, 58 U. Pmr. L. REv. 867, 887 (1997) ("Rehnquist's dictum
invites the lower federal courts to jump into the quagmire of weighing the relative value of 'societal
obligations' in determining the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to illegal aliens within the
United States.") (emphasis omitted).
96. Martinez-Aguero, 459 F.3d at 624 (ultimately declining to decide if Verdugo-Urquidez is
controlling because the claimant at issue would have satisfied the "substantial connections" test). See
also United States v. Tehrani, 826 F. Supp. 789, 793 n.1 (D. Vt. 1993) (characterizing the Rehnquist
opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez as demonstrating that "the Supreme Court firmly rejected the argument
that all aliens enjoy certain constitutional rights.")
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struggled to find a consistent method for analyzing a claimant's
connections to the United States.
The Supreme Court of Florida, for example, characterized Verdugo as
holding "that the fourth amendment does not apply to the search and
seizure by the United States agents of property owned by a nonresident
alien and located in a foreign country when that nonresident alien has no
voluntary attachment to the United States."97 Based on that understanding
of Verdugo, the court proceeded to determine whether the claimant, a
foreign national living in the United States who challenged the
admissibility of evidence seized in Germany, had sufficient connections for
Fourth Amendment rights to attach. 98 With little explanation, the court
found that the claimant satisfied the test.99 The court seemed to opine that
voluntary legal residence in the United States was patently sufficient.100
The court in United States v. Tehrani reached a similar conclusion.101
There, the claimants had fraudulently obtained tourist visas and entered the
United States voluntarily.102  This connection was sufficient: "[their]
presence in the United States was voluntary, and they had gained
admission, albeit surreptitiously, for a temporary visit as tourists."' These
connections, the court held, differed significantly from the lawful, but
involuntary, connection at issue in Verdugo.104
Several courts have been more careful to catalog claimants' individual
interactions with the United States. 05 In Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzales, for
97. Riechmann v. State, 581 So.2d 133, 138 (Fla. 1991). In Riechmann, a German national living
in Florida was accused of murdering his long-time friend and "life companion[]" Kersten Kischnick. Id.
at 135. The state sought to prove that "Kischnick was a prostitute [and] Riechmann was her pimp
supported by her income, and when she decided to quit prostitution, he killed her to recover insurance
proceeds." Id.
98. Id. at 138. Riechmann sought to exclude insurance policies seized in Germany showing that
Riechmann would have received close to one million dollars in the event of Kischnick's accidental
death. Id. at 136.
99. Id. at 138 ("Riechmann did have a voluntary attachment to the United States and thus had
greater entitlement to fourth amendment protection, having assumed the benefits and burdens of
American law when he chose to come to this country.").
100. Id.
101. Tehrani, 826 F. Supp. at 793 n. 1 (addressing the issue of whether aliens on a tourist visa
were covered by the Fourth Amendment such that they could invoke the exclusionary rule, even though
none of the parties had raised that issue).
102. Id at 796-97.
103. Id. at 793 n.1.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzales, No. EP-03-CA-41 1(KC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2412, at *15-16 (W.D. Tex Feb. 2, 2005) (finding that the Verdugo "substantial connections" language
was merely persuasive authority, but independently determining that the test should be applied in the
case at bar), aff'd, 459 F.3d 618, 624-25 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Atienzo, No. 2:04-CR-
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example, the claimant had made numerous visits to the United States with a
valid border crossing pass to accompany her aunt to the nearest Social
Security office.' 06 When her border-crossing pass expired, she re-entered
the United States illegally, though with a good-faith belief that her entry
was authorized.107 According to the Texas district court, the claimant's past
visits to the United States, combined with her good-faith attempt to abide
by U.S. immigration laws constituted sufficient connections for her to
make a Fourth Amendment claim. 08 On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, which
declined to decide whether Verdugo indeed required the application of the
"substantial connections" test but found that the claimant would have
nonetheless satisfied the test, the Fifth Circuit added that "aliens with
substantial connections are those who are in this country voluntarily and
presumably [have] accepted some societal obligations."' 09 The Fifth Circuit
agreed with the claimant's contention that her regular lawful entry and her
voluntary submission to the U.S. immigration system were sufficient. 1' 0
Similarly, a district court in Utah held that an undocumented
immigrant's nine-year presence within the United States, employment
within the country, filing of U.S. tax returns, and relationship to immediate
family members in the U.S. fulfilled Verdugo's test."'
While prior entrances to the United States held a great deal of weight
for the court in Martinez-Aguero, other courts have found them
insufficient. In American Immigration Lawyers Association v. Reno, for
example, a district court opined that an alien's repeated trips to the United
States to visit an ill daughter and grandchild would have been insufficient
005534, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31652, at *2 (D. Utah Dec. 6, 2005).
106. See Martinez-Aguero, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2412, at *61.
107. Id. at *64-65.
108. Id.
109. Martinez-Aguero, 459 F.3d at 625 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
110. Id.
Ill. Atienzo, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31652, at *16-18. Because the government had argued that
the claimant in Atienzo was categorically excluded from the protections of the Fourth Amendment by
virtue of his undocumented status, the government failed to submit evidence refuting the claimant's
alleged connections. The court called attention to and relied on this aspect of the case in its finding of
"substantial connections." Id. at * 18. ("Having rejected the categorical position that all illegal aliens as
a class lack sufficient connection to this country to assert Fourth Amendment rights, the court has no
legal arguments before it disputing Atienzo's specific position that he has sufficient connections. In
light of [this], the simplest course is for the court to then accept the uncontested . . . claim [to] Fourth
Amendment protection."). Interestingly, the same court that decided Atienzo had, just two years earlier,
held that previously deported undocumented immigrant felons were categorically outside the protection
of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1267 (D. Utah
2003), affd on other grounds, 386 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 2004). I discuss Esparza-Mendoza and other
similar cases in subsection B.3 of this Part.
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to satisfy Verdugo's substantial connections test.112 Though the opinions in
which courts attempt to apply Verdugo's substantial connections test differ
in their evaluation of the contacts at issue, they share an important
commonality: they evaluate individuals' substantial connections on a case
by case basis.
3. Verdugo as a Categorical Bar on the Fourth Amendment Rights of
Undocumented Immigrants
A third interpretation of Verdugo rejects a case by case evaluation of
individuals' connections to the United States in favor of a categorical
exclusion of certain classes of undocumented immigrants from Fourth
Amendment protection. This third approach developed only recently, and
though few courts espouse such an approach, public concerns about
immigration may propel courts to increasingly adopt it in the future.113
Because few courts have thus far taken such an approach, there is no
consensus on which classes of undocumented immigrants are outside the
Fourth Amendment's ambit.
Two courts have held that previously deported undocumented
immigrant felons cannot claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment-
as to those individuals, the government may properly conduct searches
without Fourth Amendment limitations. The District of Utah's opinion in
United States v. Esparza-Mendozal14 gives a lengthy defense of just such a
rule. There, a criminal defendant sought to exclude an identification card
112. Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass'n v. Reno, 18 F. Supp. 2d 38, 59-60 & n.17 (D.D.C. 1998).
Notably, the plaintiff in the case claimed a violation of due process rather than a Fourth Amendment
violation, and the district court interpreted Verdugo to apply to all constitutional protections. However,
the district court ultimately determined that the "substantial connections" test was inapplicable to the
claimant; the claimant was excluded from due process protections because she was merely a
prospective entrant to the United States, rather than someone who was within the United States. The
court's conclusion parallels substantial precedent holding that visitors arriving in the United States are
not on U.S. soil for purposes of the law. Rather, they are treated as being outside of the United States
until formally admitted such that due process rights do not apply to proceedings held to determine
admissibility. Id. at 60 (noting that "overwhelming case law, including that of this circuit, hold[s] that
initial entrants have no due process rights with respect to their admission"). See also Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338
U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
113. Though denial of Fourth Amendment rights to undocumented immigrants in criminal
proceedings is relatively new, it has established corollaries in immigration proceedings. For a
discussion of aliens' diminished Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights in immigration court, see Jennifer
M. Chac6n, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth
Amendment Rights, 59 DuKE L.J. 1563 (2010). Chac6n notes that the denial of Fourth Amendment
rights in criminal court evidences "that the slippage in procedural protections threatens to spread from
immigration court to the criminal court." Id at 1620.
114. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1269-71.
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that was the result of an allegedly illegal search and that ultimately allowed
a police officer to identify the defendant as the subject of a previously
issued fugitive warrant. "' Esparza had first entered the United States in
1997 when he crossed the border from Mexico without authorization.' 16
After two years, a Utah state court convicted him of a felony, and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") subsequently deported him
to Mexico."' However, by the time of the allegedly illegal search, which
took place in 2002, Esparza was back in the United States, once again
without authorization."' The government argued that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to Esparza. 119
To determine whether Esparza had "substantial connections" to the
United States, the court embarked on a discussion of, "first, the historical
background regarding the attachment of alien felons to the political
community, and, second, the specific facts surrounding [Esparza]."l 20 With
respect to the history of alien felons, the court noted that the Framers
"would have had grave concerns about criminal aliens in particular," and
highlighted Britain's practice of sending convicted felons to its colonies as
indentured servants.1 21 Even after Britain could no longer send convicts to
the U.S., the court noted, many of the states passed legislation prohibiting
the transportation of convicts across their state borders.' 22 The historical
exclusion of alien criminals, in combination with the exclusion of aliens
from voting, weighed against a finding that an alien criminal could be "part
of or connected to the nation's political community. To the contrary, the
historical materials suggest that the Framers were doing everything
possible to exclude such persons from the national community."123
115. Id. at 1256.
116. Id. at 1255.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1256.
119. Id. at 1258.
120. Id. at 1267. Before determining whether Esparza satisfied Verdugo's "substantial
connections" test, the court addressed Esparza's argument that Verdugo did not control his claim. Id at
1260. The court disagreed. Id. at 1260-61. Because a majority of the Justices joined Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in Verdugo, the opinion could not be called a plurality opinion: "This court is not at liberty to
second-guess Justice Kennedy's direct statement that he was joining the Court's opinion.
Therefore,... its 'sufficient connection' language must be followed here." Id. at 1261. Moreover,
explained the Esparza court, the "substantial connections" test was sound law in light of the history and
text of the Fourth Amendment: "Even if the court is mistaken about the controlling effect of Verdugo-
Urquidez, the court independently reaches the same conclusion that the Fourth Amendment extends
only to those persons who have sufficient connection with this country." Id. at 1261.
121. Id at 1268.
122. Id. at 1268-69.
123. Id.
1092011]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
Although the court next purported to analyze Esparza's connections to
the United States, the court merely restated Esparza's prior encounters with
the INS. When Esparza failed to introduce any evidence of his connections
with the United States, the court explained that U.S. law would prevent an
undocumented immigrant from establishing such connections: an
undocumented alien "cannot be lawfully employed," is not "entitled to
federal or state public benefits," "can be restricted from voting or running
for office," and "may not lawfully possess firearms." 24 The court looked
not to Esparza's actual connections, but to what undocumented immigrants,
as a class, may or may not lawfully do within the country. Despite having
initially characterized its analysis as an inquiry into Esparza's individual
connections to the United States, the court ultimately acknowledged its
categorical approach in the holding:
[P]reviously deported alien felons, such as Esparza-Mendoza, are not
covered by the Fourth Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the court
has made a categorical determination about previously deported aliens.
In other words, an individual previously deported alien felon is not free
to argue that, in his particular case, he possesses a sufficient connection
to this country to receive Fourth Amendment coverage (unless, of
course, he could prove he was in this country lawfully).125
The Tenth Circuit later avoided the "substantial connections" issue
entirely by affirming Esparza-Mendoza on other grounds.126
Nonetheless, the Utah district court's reasoning has found favor
elsewhere. A district court in Kansas agreed with Esparza-Mendoza's
conclusion.127 In United States v. Gutierrez-Casada, the court held that
previously deported alien felons present in the United States without
authorization are outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment.128 in
addition to echoing Esparza-Mendoza's reasoning, the court commented on
modem justifications for excluding undocumented immigrants from Fourth
Amendment protections:
[I]llegal aliens are among persons "typically considered dangerous or
irresponsible" because: they have "already violated a law of this
country" and are "likely to maintain no permanent address in this
124. Id. at 1270.
125. Id. at 1271. Interestingly, Judge Paul Cassell, who decided this case, would later find that
Esparza-Mendoza was irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment rights of an undocumented immigrant who
had not previously been deported as an alien felon. United States v. Atienzo, No. 2:04-CR-005534
PGC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31652, (D. Utah Dec. 6, 2005), discussed in Part II.B.2, supra.
126. United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 386 F.3d 953, 960 (10th Cir. 2004).
127. United States v. Gutierrez-Casada, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (D. Kansas 2008).
128. Id. at 1272.
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country, elude detection through an assumed identity, and-already
living outside the law-resort to illegal activities to maintain a
livelihood."l 29
The court further argued that a previously deported alien felon stands
in virtually the same shoes as a prison escapee,130 a parolee,'31 and a
trespasser,132 all of whom have little, if any, expectations of privacy under
the Fourth Amendment.
One court has gone further than the courts in Esparza-Mendoza and
Gutierrez-Casada to hold that aliens, as a rule, cannot establish substantial
connections with the United States until they have entered legally.133 In
United State v. Ullah, the alien defendant's connections to friends and
family members within the United States were irrelevant because the
defendant had not gained lawful admission to the U.S.134
In some courts, unauthorized presence in the United States has played
a factor, if not determined, the question of whether an individual has
"substantial connections" to the United States.' 35 A Texas state court, for
example, held that the Fourth Amendment and its state equivalent did not
apply to the claimant.136 In evaluating the claimant's connections to the
United States, the court emphasized the fact that his tourist visa had
expired, although his lack of employment seemed to also play a role in the
decision.137 Cases in which courts have held or suggested that individuals
lawfully present in the country are automatically entitled to the protections
of the Fourth Amendment without regard to actual connections to the
country also provide some evidence that a categorical approach, in which
legal status determines the applicability of the Fourth Amendment, may be
growing.138
129. Id at 1267 (quoting United States v. Juan Ochoa-Cochado, 521 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir.
2008)).
130. Id. at 1267 ("Defendant's presence anywhere in the United States is wrongful, just as an
escaped felon's presence anywhere outside his prison is wrongful. The court views defendant's Fourth
Amendment position at the time of the search as akin to that of a constructive escapee.").
131. Id. at 1266-67.
132. Id. at 1269 ("Defendant's Fourth Amendment position at the time of the search is also
comparable to that of a trespasser who has entered on another's land without the landowner's
consent.").
133. United State v. Ullah, No. 04-CR-30A(F), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12419, at *99 (W.D.N.Y.
Mar. 17, 2005).
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Torres v. State, 818 S.W.2d 141, 143 & n.l (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), vacated, 825
S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v.
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A categorical approach based on status is an untenable reading of
Verdugo's text, because the facts in Verdugo foreclose such an
interpretation. Verdugo himself was an authorized alien in the United
States. He was present by virtue of the U.S. government's forced
transportation across U.S. borders; the government explicitly allowed
him-or required him-to be present within the United States.
Nonetheless, he had insufficient connections to the United States. Clearly,
Verdugo's lack of sufficient connections cannot be attributable to
unauthorized status. Rather, the Court specifically noted that Verdugo's
presence in the United States was involuntary; Verdugo did not manifest
any willing submission to U.S. law. Although the inconsistency of this
third approach to Verdugo with the actual text of the opinion significantly
undermines cases like Esparza-Mendoza, as I argue below, it is the
incongruency of those cases with the trajectory of membership theory in
United States law that most persuasively calls for reexamination of this
categorical approach.
1II. SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTIONS: TOWARD A POST-
TERRITORIAL APPROACH TO MEMBERSHIP
In its simplest form, membership is about belonging and inclusion.
This concept plays a central role in our human understanding of the world;
we order our interactions with each other and our surroundings by
ascertaining who and what belongs where. From an early age, we learn to
sort shapes, identify the object that does not belong, and pick out the color
or texture that is different. As a society, we translate these skills into our
cultural and legal structure: we sort members from nonmembers in order to
assign privileges and responsibilities. From fitness clubs and video rental
clubs to sororities and labor unions, the concept of membership serves as a
gatekeeper to benefits and privileges. Legal rights are no exception-they
are the privileges of membership in a more abstract "club."
The voting franchise, for example, is generally open only to U.S.
citizens over the age of majority. Voting is the privilege of membership in
the U.S. political community. While this is a broadly inclusive club, it
excludes a number of individuals. Exclusion, it turns out, is an unavoidable
byproduct of inclusion. As a result, membership rules-the mechanisms by
Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1234 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting)) (stating that the
Fourth Amendment protects "lawful resident aliens within the borders of the United States 'who are
victims of actions taken in the United States by American officials,"' but declining to decide whether
the Fourth Amendment protects lawful resident aliens from unlawful searches that take place outside
the U.S.) (emphasis added).
112 [Vol. 85:85
INSIDE THE BORDER, OUTSIDE THE LAW
which we sort members from nonmembers-are a volatile subject in the
legal arena as legislators and courts struggle with the meaning of belonging
and accordingly expand and contract the reach of government-secured
rights.' 39
Fourth Amendment rights are no exception; they are privileges of
membership that correspond to inclusion in a club, and courts wrestle with
the contours of its membership.' 40 In that sense, Verdugo is peculiarly
about membership-it is about formulating a rule for determining who gets
Fourth Amendment privileges. In fact, Verdugo's progeny serves as a
singularly useful study in the role of membership theory in U.S. law. The
three general approaches that courts have taken in applying Verdugo
parallel the competing approaches to membership currently identifiable in
U.S. law: a strictly territorial model, a post-territorial approach, and a
status-based model.141 In this part, I describe these three membership
models, giving examples of their application in U.S. law. I then compare
the three interpretations of Verdugo's effect on the Fourth Amendment
rights of aliens in the United States, arguing that each Verdugo
interpretation is a manifestation of a membership model. Finally, I re-
examine Verdugo through a membership theory lens and place it in the
broader trajectory of membership theory in U.S. law, which I argue is
moving toward post-territoriality. In that context, I conclude, not only does
Verdugo emerge as a quintessential post-territorial case, but it also becomes
a pivotal case moving U.S. alienage law toward such an approach.
139. The voting franchise has been shaped by just such a dynamic. Contrary to popular
perceptions of the right to vote as one that has gradually and consistently become more inclusionary, the
"history of the right to vote in America is one of expansion and contraction, of punctuated equilibria,
rather than gradual evolution." Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the
Right to Vote, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1345 (2003).
140. Membership is meaningless without reference to a particular sphere of membership. Just as
the Rotary Club has different membership criteria than does the local fitness club, membership for
purposes of Fourth Amendment protection may have different requirements than membership for
purposes of other legal benefits. Interestingly, scholarly literature on membership does not clearly make
this distinction, which contributes to a lack of clarity in the discussion of membership. Sometimes,
membership refers to a general political membership, sometimes it refers to membership for purposes of
Constitutional rights, and sometimes it refers to membership for purposes of basic human rights.
Throughout this Article, membership denotes the broad concept of belonging, as applied in the sphere
of the Fourth Amendment.
141. It is worth noting that a fourth membership model, the human rights model, sometimes
appears in alienage law literature. Under this model, certain rights attach to individuals simply by virtue
of personhood, irrespective of status or location. Because this approach has had little clout in U.S.
alienage law decisions, I do not discuss it here. For articles advocating a human rights approach, see
Linda Bosniak, Persons and Citizens in Constitutional Thought, 8 INT'L J. CONsT. L. 9 (2010) and M.
Isabel Medina, Exploring the Use ofthe Word "Citizen" in Writings on the Fourth Amendment, 83 IND.
L.J. 1557 (2008).
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A. THREE VERDUGOS, THREE MEMBERSHIP MODELS
The near-perfect alignment of the three interpretations of Verdugo
with the three membership models identifiable in U.S. law evidence the
important, though subtle, role that membership theory plays in alienage
law. Verdugo's progeny have taken advantage of Verdugo's seemingly
contradictory language to shape Verdugo to fit a membership model-a set
of rules for sorting members from nonmembers-that seems appropriate to
the deciding court. Verdugo, then, has three membership faces: a territorial
face, a post-territorial face, and a status-based face.
1. The Territorial Model: Using Geography as a Proxy
a. Territoriality, Generally
Territoriality distributes membership rights and benefits according to
geographic boundaries, without reference to heritage, community ties, legal
status, or any other criterion.142 Under a strict territorial approach,
individuals within a state's territory are members entitled to all rights
offered by the state, while individuals outside the state territory have no
guaranteed rights. 4 3 Thus, in its simplest form, territoriality's dividing line
is the nation-state's border.144
Territoriality has played a significant role in U.S. law, and many of
our legal constructs derive their structure from this approach. Under the
U.S. concept ofjus soli, or birthright citizenship, individuals born on U.S.
soil automatically gain U.S. citizenship without regard to the child's status
or parentage.145 Similarly, presence within the United States guarantees an
undocumented immigrant child a right to the same free public education
142. NEUMAN, supra note 21, at 6-8 (dividing approaches to the distribution of constitutional
rights into membership approaches, mutuality approaches, universality, and global due process);
Bosniak, supra note 21, at 391. See also Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual
Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 955, 1031 (1988).
143. See Bosniak, supra note 21, at 394.
144. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 42-44
(1983).
145. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States .... ). Of course, jus soli has
received renewed criticism in recent years. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Birthright of a Nation, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, at A19 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require automatic
bestowal of citizenship on the children of undocumented immigrants born in the United States). But see
Garrett Epps, The Citizenship Clause: A Legislative History, 60 AM. U. L. REv. 331, 343 (2010)
(disagreeing with Schuck and arguing that the historical context of the Fourteenth Amendment's
passage supports birthright citizenship for all individuals born in the United States.).
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enjoyed by U.S. citizens and authorized residents.' 46 Indeed, all individuals
present within the United States are entitled to equal protection under the
law and due process by exclusive virtue of their presence here. 147
b. Verdugo as a Territorial Case
Courts that have dismissed Verdugo's "substantial connections"
language as irrelevant to the rights of aliens in the United States' 4  have
essentially adopted a territorial approach to membership. Verdugo, under
this view, is a case about exclusion based on extra-territoriality. These
courts have found the "substantial connections" language to be mere dicta
from a divided Supreme Court.14 9 The crux of the issue in Verdugo, for
these courts, was the location of the searched property.so After all, Justice
Rehnquist had been careful to note that because the searched property was
outside U.S. borders, and because a violation of the Fourth Amendment is
complete upon the conclusion of an illegal search or seizure, any Fourth
Amendment violation occurred in Mexico.' 51 Moreover, the plurality
opinion further emphasized U.S. Supreme Court precedent that had
declined to extend constitutional rights to aliens abroad.' 52 If it was only
the location of the property outside the United States that foreclosed the
application of the Fourth Amendment, it is not a large leap in logic to
assume that location within the United States would require the opposite
result.
Presumably, for the courts that interpret Verdugo this way, the U.S.
146. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). See also David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 953, 978 (2002) ("[R]elatively little turns on citizenship status. The right to vote and the right to
run for federal elective office are restricted to citizens, but all of the other rights are written without
such limitation.").
147. Of course, whether someone is present in the United States can be ambiguous. First, knowing
whether someone is within U.S. territory presupposes an understanding of what, exactly, constitutes
U.S. territory. This has not always been an easy inquiry. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,
771 (2008) (discussing whether Guantanamo Bay is under U.S. sovereignty such that enemy
combatants held there may assert habeas rights). Second, even someone factually on U.S. soil may be
legally absent from the U.S. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213
(1953) (holding that denying the petitioner's admission to the United States on national security
grounds, and subsequently detaining him for twenty-one months without a determination of his danger
to the public's safety was not a violation of due process: "In sum, harborage at Ellis Island is not an
entry into the United States.").
148. See supra Part II.B.1, where I catalogue the reasons courts have chosen to interpret Verdugo
as a case about the extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment rather than an alienage law
case.
149. See supra Part II.B. 1.
150. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990).
151. Id at 262.
152. Id. at 267-68.
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border marks the line between inclusion in and exclusion from Fourth
Amendment protection, and these courts would be likely to apply the
Fourth Amendment's protections to all individuals within U.S. territory. Of
course, this raises an important question: What is so important about
territory that these courts are willing to base the distribution of fundamental
constitutional rights on location?
c. Territoriality's Rationales
While territoriality is easy to apply, predictable,153 and inclusive, the
rationales for a purely territorial approach to legal rights escape precise
identification. 154 What is it about being within the United States that
renders an individual deserving of membership? How does crossing a
border make an individual any more a "member" of the United States (or of
any other "club" for that matter)? Clearly, territory, as an abstract concept,
means nothing. An individual's physical location changes nothing about
her characteristics or traits that might be relevant to determining whether
she is a member or should be a member of any particular club.
Rather, territorial presence must be a proxy for other indicators of
membership. Territorial presence must stand for a larger concept, one that
more intuitively raises a presumption of membership and belonging.
Commentators have offered three types of rationales for a territorial
approach to membership by identifying more fundamental indicators of
membership for which territorial presence serves as proxy. However, none
of the proffered rationales adequately justifies a strictly territorial approach
to membership.
i. Mutuality of Obligation
Territoriality is likely based, in part, on the notion that the state must
afford protections to those within its territory because those are the
individuals upon whom it may impose obligations. Thus, because presence
within the United States subjects an individual to the obligations of U.S.
law, it also guarantees protections.'5 ' The individual, in effect, has accepted
the state's jurisdiction over her simply by being here.'56 Voluntary
presence within the United States reflects (and serves as a proxy for) a
willing submission to U.S. law, which requires reciprocal corresponding
153. See infra Part IV.B.
154. For a more detailed discussion of territoriality's rationales, see Nifez, supra note 25.
155. See NEUMAN, supra note 21, at 107-08 (describing territoriality as based on mutuality of
obligation); Bosniak, supra note 21, at 408.
156. See NEUMAN, supra note 21, at 107-08.
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rights from the state.157
Mutuality of obligation as a rationale for territoriality makes a lot of
sense in a purely Westphalian world, where states only impose obligations
on individuals within their territory, and individuals within a territory are
exclusively subject to the obligations imposed by the sovereign charged
with that territory."' Where, rather than who, the individual is, determines
what rules apply.159
The reality, however, is that states often do impose obligations upon
individuals outside of their borders and sometimes exempt individuals
within their borders from certain obligations.' 60 As a result, a membership
model based solely on mutuality of membership would not be a purely
territorial model. Rather, under a mutuality-of-obligation-based model, all
those subjecting themselves to the laws of the nation-state, whether inside
or outside the border, would be members entitled to corresponding
membership benefits.' 6 '
157. This is related to, though not entirely based on, the notion that a government, as an artificial
entity, may only act according to the powers delegated to it in its founding document. This "structural"
or "delegation" approach assumes that the founding document's objective is to constrain the power of
government rather than to affirmatively protect individual rights. Thus, wherever the government acts,
it must act under the constraints of its founding document. In the context of the Constitution, this
translates into the notion that whenever a government acts upon someone, it is constrained by the
Constitution. Where the Constitution affords "protections" it essentially limits the government from
imposing naked obligations on its subjects without enforcing corresponding rights. See Edward A.
Fallone, Charters, Compacts, and Tea Parties: The Decline and Resurrection of a Delegation View of
the Constitution, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1067, 1073 (2010) ("Under this view of the nature of
federal power, the government's ability to perform an act does not depend on the identity of the
individual who is the subject of government action."); Robert Knowles & Marc D. Falkoff, Toward a
Limited-Government Theory of Extraterritorial Detention, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 637, 641
(2007); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1688 (2004).
158. In a Westphalian conception of sovereignty, the nation-state is a unitary, self-contained actor
with complete and exclusive jurisdiction over the people within its territory. This approach to
sovereignty rejects feudal notions of sovereignty that predated the Peace of Wesphalia, in which an
individual owed overlapping allegiance to multiple vassals. See DANIEL PHILPOTT, REVOLUTIONS IN
SOVEREIGNTY: How IDEAS SHAPED MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 79 (2001) (describing feudal
allegiance as a "system of arteries in a body, not a pyramid with an apex"). See also St~phane Beaulac,
The Westphalian Model in Defining International Law: Challenging the Myth, 8 AUSTL. J. LEGAL HIST.
181, 182 (2004), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AJLH/2004/9.html; Leo Gross, The
Peace of Westphalia, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 34 (1948).
159. See Kal Raustiala, The Geography ofJustice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2514 (2005).
160. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, for example, applies to companies operating outside of
the United States. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006). Foreign diplomats to the U.S. enjoy certain
immunities from U.S. law despite their presence on U.S. soil. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations art. 27, Apr. 18, 1961,23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
161. Territoriality's inability to coincide with mutuality of obligation has resulted in some calling
for the adoption of a model that directly evaluates an individual's and state's reciprocal obligations to
each other. See Raustiala, supra note 159, at 2504 (advocating the adoption of a "rebuttable
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ii. Community Preservation
The preservation of an egalitarian system of ordering might also
justify territoriality. Under this "community preservation" rationale, 162 the
distribution of membership rights to all individuals within a territory is
desirable because it avoids the creation of an unpalatable social and legal
hierarchy.1 63  However, this rationale is not one of benevolence. An
egalitarian society is worth preserving not because it is generous to
strangers but because those who were already here desire to live in an
egalitarian community without the risk of becoming part of a future
subclass of residents. 164
iii. Community Ties
The natural formation of relationships among individuals living within
the same geographic region also might explain territoriality as a
membership model. Under this rationale, territorial presence within a state
serves as a proxy for an individual's community ties. As an individual lives
in close proximity to others, the argument goes, she forms business, social,
familial, and other relationships within the surrounding community. This
resulting loyalty, in turn, is worth preserving and therefore should be
rewarded with membership benefits. Also, as newcomers develop ties to
the surrounding community, already established members of the
community begin to depend on those newcomers. Thus, not only does
territoriality reward a newcomer's loyalty and contribution to the
presumption that when legal power is brought to bear, so too are legal protections").
162. Though others have labeled this notion of community preservation the "anti-caste" or "anti-
subjugation" principle, see, e.g., Bosniak, supra note 21, at 392-95, I use the "community preservation"
label to emphasize this rationale's focus on a social system, rather than the well-being of "the other."
163. See Bosniak, supra note 21, at 392-95.
164. Owen Fiss argues that this notion of community preservation is implicit in the Fourteenth
Amendment as "a statement about how a society wishes to organize itself, and prohibits subjugation,
even voluntary subjugation, because such a practice would disfigure society." That is, "[wie ought not
to subjugate immigrants, not because we owe them anything, but to preserve our society as a
community of equals." Owen Fiss, The Immigrant as Pariah, BOSTON REV., Oct.-Nov. 1998, 4, 6. See
also Thomas Jefferson, Drafts of the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, 1795-1801 303 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed. 1896) ("[T]he friendless alien has indeed been
selected as the safest subject of a first experiment; but the citizen will soon follow. . . ."); WALZER,
supra note 144, at 63. This phenomenon is easily identifiable in labor and employment law, where the
inability of one class of persons to assert claims against their employer for violations of employment
laws allows the employer to coerce all employees into silence. In effect, the employer may selectively
replace complaining employees with members of the rightless underclass, thus encouraging all of the
employees to refrain from asserting rights. See Nufiez, supra note 25, at 864-68; Hiroshi Motomura,
The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1753-54
(2010) (discussing "the practical ties between unauthorized migrants and other persons whose welfare
depends on how the law treats the unauthorized" and suggesting that this empowers undocumented
immigrants through "citizen proxies").
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surrounding community, but it protects the surrounding community's ties
and relationships to-and resulting dependence on-the newcomer. Under
the community ties rationale, then, territoriality keeps communities
intact. 16
The inclusive nature of the community ties rationale and its intuitive
logic makes it a favorite among commentators. However, territorial
presence within a community is an increasingly inappropriate proxy for
community ties because physical proximity does not dictate affiliations the
way it may have in the past.166 The world is a smaller place today than it
was two hundred-even fifty-years ago. Individuals in the United States
can easily maintain business, social, and family relationships that span
political borders. Cousins on opposite sides of the globe are an inexpensive
Internet call away from each other; business colleagues can traverse seven
time zones in a matter of hours to attend in-person meetings; friends
everywhere share photos and videos on social networking Internet sites
accessed from mobile devices. Not only is it possible to maintain
relationships across borders, it is also possible for an individual to have
very little affiliation with those inside the country in which she resides.
Even where an individual does have ties to others within the nation-state's
borders, these ties may be attributable to something other than physical
proximity. For example, Texans and New Yorkers live within U.S. borders,
but the relationships that Texans maintain with New Yorkers is unlikely a
result of their shared location within U.S. borders-in this case, the nation-
state's borders do not ensure proximity.
2. The Post-Territorial Model: A Rejection of Inadequate Proxies
a. Post-Territoriality, Defined
Courts are increasingly taking note of territoriality's failure to always
produce results consistent with its underlying rationales. Territorial
presence, it seems, is a disappointing proxy for the more fundamental
indicators of membership inherent in territoriality's underlying
rationales.' 67 As a result, U.S. courts and commentators have begun to
abandon the proxy of territorial presence in favor of a more substantive
analysis of an individual's community ties and obligations to the United
165. See supra Part III.A.I.c.ii.
166. For a discussion of "place" and its overstated relationship with identity and responsibility,
see Doreen Massey, Geographies of Responsibility, 86 GEoGRAFIsKA ANNALER, Series B, Human
Geography, 5-18 (2004), available at http://oro.open.ac.uk/7224/1 /Geographies of responsibilitySept
03.pdf.
167. See Nfilez, supra note 25, at 842.
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States-along with the corresponding government obligation to the
individual-as well as the risk of detrimentally altering the character of the
U.S. community.'68
This approach, which I have called the post-territorial approach
because of its rejection of geography and adherence to the underlying
rationales of territoriality,' 69 is underdeveloped and lacks a cohesive
framework. The post-territorial model is in early stages of development as
courts, likely without any intention of creating a new membership
paradigm, elevate one or all of the underlying rationales of territoriality to
the forefront of analysis. As a whole, Supreme Court precedent in the area
of alienage law and extraterritorial law suggests that much of U.S. law that
was once governed by territoriality is moving toward a distribution of
rights based on a balancing of the three rationales underlying
territoriality. 7 0 Thus, where territorial presence was once the focus of
analysis, mutuality of obligation, community ties, and community
preservation have taken its place.'7 '
Clearly, post-territoriality forsakes predictability and clarity in favor
of fairness and more desirable results.' 72 Ascertaining whether an
individual is standing on the U.S. or the Canadian side of the border is
much easier than determining whether the individual has community ties or
voluntarily assumes the obligations of U.S. law. Likewise, evaluating
whether an individual is a citizen, a legal permanent resident, or an
undocumented immigrant (as required for the status-based approach
discussed below) poses fewer challenges than determining the quality and
number of an individual's ties to the United States or the nature of her
obligation to the United States.
Nonetheless, courts and legislators are slowly contributing to the
development of this emerging post-territorial approach. The Supreme
168. See id.
169. Id. at 847.
170. Id. See also infra Part III.B.1 (summarizing the gradual transformation of the territorial
model to produce a post-territorial model).
171. These, of course, are also difficult to measure and are thus inevitably measured with
reference to other, hopefully more accurate, proxies, as discussed later in this Article.
172. Of course, with the loss of predictability, comes a potential increase in discretion, which
allows courts to inject majoritarian values and social norms into the analysis. Thus, a more nuanced
post-territorial approach to membership is susceptible to critique by critical race theorists who argue
that discretion subjects ethnic minorities to unfair application of the law. See George A. Martinez, Legal
Indeterminacy, Judicial Discretion and the Mexican-American Litigation Experience: 1930-1980, 27
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 555 (1994). As I explain below, however, a more nuanced and substantive
approach to membership may be achieved without resorting to an amorphous balancing test by
referencing more effective proxies. See infra Part IV.
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Court's opinion in Boumediene v. Bush,'73 for example, explicitly rejected
the contention that Guantanamo Bay detainees were categorically outside
the ambit of the right to the writ of habeas on account of their absence from
U.S. territory.'74 Instead, the Court adopted a more functional approach that
examined the actual, de facto power that the United States exerts over the
detainees. The detainees, the Court explained, answered exclusively to U.S.
law rather than Cuban law despite their technical presence on Cuban
soil.'7 1 In essence, the Court examined the question of mutuality of
obligation without reference to territorial presence as a proxy.176
Cancellation of removal,"' under which undocumented immigrants may
avoid deportation, provides another salient example of an area governed by
a post-territorial model. This example is an especially important one
because immigration law has often been governed by a status-based
approach, discussed below, that awards rights based on legal status.
However, under cancellation rules, an alien, though present within the
United States without authorization and found deportable, may be given the
status of a permanent legal resident. The alien must, among other things,
show that she has been present in the United States for ten years, has been
of good moral character, and deportation will result in exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to a relative in the United States."' These
criteria conform with the three factors balanced in the post-territorial
approach: length of presence in the United States corresponds to
community ties, extreme and unusual hardship to a U.S. relative
corresponds to community ties and community preservation, and good
moral character arguably corresponds to community ties and willingness to
take on societal and legal obligations. 7 9
173. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008).
174. See id at 770-71.
175. See id. at 751 (explaining that "no law other than the laws of the United States applies at the
naval station" even though Cuba retains technical sovereignty over Guantanamo.). For an analysis of
Boumediene's functional approach to the extraterritorial application of the Constitution, see Gerald L.
Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 259, 261
(2009).
176. For a more detailed analysis of Boumediene, see infra Part III.B.2.b.
177. Under section 240A of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), both legal permanent
residents who are found deportable and unauthorized aliens may apply for "cancellation" of their
removal order, which, in the case of a legal permanent resident results in a restoration of that status. An
undocumented immigrant whose deportation is canceled receives legal permanent residence.
Cancellation requires both eligibility, which is defined by the statute, and a favorable exercise of
discretion by the immigration judge. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b
(2006).
178. See id. § 1229b(b)(1).
179. Admittedly, the cancellation statute's rules use proxies-length of stay in U.S. and hardship
to U.S. relatives, for example-to measure membership. Although post-territoriality is an attempt to
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b. Verdugo as a Post-Territorial Case
Characterizing Verdugo as a post-territorial case poses few challenges.
The plurality opinion implicitly rejected the notion that territory serves as
an adequate indicator of membership and instead required something
more-"substantial connections." This language brings to mind the
community ties rationale of territoriality, suggesting that what Verdugo
ultimately attempts is to strip territoriality of its preoccupation with
geography and turn directly to the rationales underlying territoriality. This
is precisely what post-territoriality does.'s 0 In Part III.B below, I develop
the post-territorial theme in Verdugo in great detail.
3. The Status-Based Model: Using Status as a Proxy
a. The Status-Based Model, Defined
A status-based approach to membership sorts members from
nonmembers based on status.' 8 ' This approach values the state's consent
above all else. In such a system, an undocumented immigrant, whose
entrance the state has not consented to, enjoys the fewest number of
membership rights despite territorial presence, community ties, or any other
factors. A citizen, on the other hand, has access to the full suite of
membership rights available. Given the variety of legal statuses available in
the United States, this model translates into a multi-tiered system in which
individuals gain increasingly inclusive packages of rights as they ascend
the hierarchy of status.' 82
Although much of U.S. law has been dominated by the territorial
shed proxies in favor of more accurate indicators of membership, a system that replaces existing proxies
with more accurate ones, as INA § 240A(b) does, approaches a post-territorial approach. I do not argue
that the use of any proxy is impermissible, but merely that post-territoriality is a rejection of proxies
that are no longer useful.
180. In a recent article, Jeffrey Kahn criticizes Verdugo's "substantial connections" test,
especially as courts have treated it as a requirement of standing, on the basis that it is inconsistent with
any coherent constitutional membership theory. Jeffrey Kahn, Zoya's Standing Problem, or, When
Should the Constitution Follow the Flag?, 108 MICH. L. REv. 673, 676 (2010). For example, he argues,
the test is inimical to a territorial view of the constitution, which would ask only whether an individual
is on the inside or the outside of a border. Likewise, according to Kahn, it bears no relationship to a
social compact approach (similar to what I have called a status-based approach) to the Constitution. Id.
at 676-77. However, Kahn does not take into account the rationales of these approaches to determine
whether the substantial connections test best fits. Dissecting territoriality reveals territoriality's
metamorphosis toward post-territoriality and the substantial connections test's relationship to this new
approach to membership.
181. Bosniak, supra note 21, at 390.
182. Cf THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS
AND POLICY 2 (6th ed. 2008).
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approach' and now moves toward post-territoriality, several areas of law
follow a status-based approach. Voting is perhaps the most identifiable
example: only citizens are members of the voting franchise. 8 4 A status-
based approach also informs the United States' complex system of social
and welfare benefits, in which legal permanent residents receive more
benefits than do tourists, and citizens enjoy eligibility for more benefits
than do legal residents.'8 5 In most states, the right to obtain a driver's
license depends on the applicant's legal status, with undocumented
immigrants ineligible to apply.1 86
b. Verdugo as a Status-Based Case
The courts that have used Verdugo's "substantial connections" test to
categorically deny certain classes of undocumented immigrants Fourth
Amendment protection18 1 subscribe to a status-based membership
model.188 By denying rights based on immigration status, the courts have
reverted to a system of proxies for determining whether an individual is a
member for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. These courts would likely
argue that an undocumented immigrant or a previously deported alien felon
is unlikely to have the community ties or sense of obligation to the United
States that a legal immigrant does. In many cases, that assumption may be
true, but regardless of these courts' reference to "substantial connections,"
183. See supra Part III.A.1.a.
184. Of course, this has not always been true. In the nineteenth century, a territorial conception of
membership governed alien suffrage, with at least twenty-two states and territories allowing for
noncitizen voting. Virginia Harper-Ho, Noncitizen Voting Rights: The History, the Law and Current
Prospects for Change, 21 IMMIGR. & NAT'LITY L. REV. 477, 479 (2000).
185. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 182, at 528-31.
186. State laws regarding eligibility for driver's licenses have increasingly followed a status-based
conception of membership. In 2005, approximately half of all states required that driver's license
applicants be lawfully present in the United States. ALISON M. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL32127, SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS ON THE ISSUANCE OF DRIVER'S LICENSES TO UNDOCUMENTED
ALIENS, 2, 5-6, 13 (2005). In response to the REAL ID Act of 2005, which provides minimum
standards for states' issuance of drivers licenses in order for those licenses to be recognized as valid
identification in certain settings, most states have enacted legislation precluding undocumented
immigrants from obtaining driver's licenses. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231.
As of late 2011, only New Mexico and Washington allow undocumented immigrants to apply for
driver's licenses, and Utah allows undocumented immigrants to apply for a "Driving Privilege Card."
See Marc Lacey, License Access in New Mexico Is Heated Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2011, at Al;
Nkoyo lyamba, REAL ID Act Making It Hard for Legal Immigrants to Renew Drives Licenses,
KSL.coM (Sept. 30, 2011, 7:44 PM), http://www.ksl.com/?nid=148&sid=17472630.
187. See supra Part II.B.3 for a description of these cases.
188. Isabel Medina correlates this with the increasing use of the word "citizen" in Fourth
Amendment discussions and argues that using status-based labels is inappropriate in the Fourth
Amendment context. M. Isabel Medina, Exploring the Use of the Word "Citizen" in Writings on the
Fourth Amendment, 83 IND. L.J. 1557 (2008).
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they are not measuring membership through connections to the United
States, but rather through legal status.
B. FINDING VERDUGO'S TRUE CHARACTER
Although courts have unwittingly fashioned Verdugo's holding into a
pliable conception of the Fourth Amendment that embraces multiple
membership models, an analysis of the trajectory of membership theory in
U.S. law, in combination with the reasoning employed by the Justices in
Verdugo, reveals that Verdugo is an archetypal post-territorial case. In fact,
Verdugo marks the turning point in U.S. alienage law when territoriality
began transforming into post-territoriality.
In the years leading up to Verdugo, Supreme Court case law
demonstrated a more detailed attention to the importance of geography in
distributing membership rights. Rather than dogmatically applying a
territorial model, the Supreme Court carefully examined the rationales
underlying territoriality. By the time Verdugo's case appeared before the
Supreme Court, a rejection of strict territoriality was brewing, and Verdugo
posed a perfect opportunity to finally reject the exclusive use of territory as
a proxy for other indicators of membership in U.S. alienage law. Now, two
decades after Verdugo, the movement is gaining momentum, especially
with respect to the extension of rights to individuals outside U.S. borders
(which would have been impossible under a strictly territorial approach).
1. Early Adherence to Territorialityl89
Prior to Verdugo, the U.S. border marked a sharp dividing line
between those that belonged and those that did not. A century ago, this
notion was such an integral part of U.S. law that it rarely warranted
explanation. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, a seminal alienage law case, the
Supreme Court based its extension of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee
of equal protection to Chinese immigrants based exclusively on the alien's
presence within the United States.'90 Although the Court was explicit in its
espousal of a territorial model of membership, it gave no explanation for its
decision: "These provisions [of the Fourteenth Amendment] are universal
in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without
189. For a more detailed analysis of the historical development of the territorial approach to
membership, see Niilez, supra note 25 (identifying the emergence of the post-territorial approach and
applying it to criticize cases in which undocumented workers, despite federal legislation that
specifically covers them, have categorically been denied remedies for workplace law violations on
account of their status).
190. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,369 (1886).
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regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality."191
Immigration and citizenship status, it seems, had very little importance.
Under the draconian Chinese Exclusion Act that prohibited Chinese
immigration,' 92 the petitioners would never be able to naturalize under
then-applicable U.S. law.193
Less than a decade later, in Wong Wing v. United States, the Court
underscored the irrelevance of immigration status when it held that the
alien petitioners had a right to Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections
despite allegedly being in the United States in violation of the Chinese
Exclusion Act.' 94 The Court explained that the territorial reasoning of Yick
Wo applied to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments: "[I]t must be concluded
that all persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the
protection guaranteed by those amendments, and that even aliens shall not
be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." 95
Notably, the Court explained that Congress's plenary power over
immigration, by which it may summarily exclude or remove aliens from
the country, does not limit aliens' Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections
while within the country.196 However, the Court failed to explain why
191. Id.
192. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882), repealed by Magnuson Act, ch. 344, 57
Stat. 600 (1943).
193. The prohibition on Chinese naturalization was paradoxical in light of the birthright
citizenship rule of the Fourteenth Amendment, which applied to secure U.S. citizenship for second
generation Chinese Americans. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898); Kevin R.
Johnson, Race, The Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic Mirror " into the Heart
of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1121-22 (1998) (discussing further immigration legislation by which
the United States excluded Asian non-white immigrants who were "ineligible to citizenship."). For an
account of the influence of race citizenship law, see IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: TH4E LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 39-42 (1996).
194. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896). The claimants had been summarily found
guilty and sentenced under a provision stating that any "person of Chinese descent, convicted and
adjudged to be not lawfully entitled to be or remain in the United States, shall be imprisoned at hard
labor for a period not exceeding one year, and thereafter removed from the United States." Id. at 233-
34. The government contended that the Constitution did not apply to an offense of being and remaining
unlawfully within the United States because it was "a political offense, and is not within the common-
law cases triable only by a jury." Id. at 234.
195. Id. at 238.
196. Id at 237 ("No limits can be put by the courts upon the power of congress to protect, by
summary methods, the country from the advent of aliens whose race or habits render them undesirable
as citizens, or to expel such if they have already found their way into our land, and unlawfully remain
therein. But to declare unlawful residence within the country to be an infamous crime, punishable by
deprivation of liberty and property, would be to pass out of the sphere of constitutional legislation,
unless provision were made that the fact of guilt should first be established by a judicial trial."). For an
analysis of Congress's plenary power over jurisdiction in the context of its constitutionally limited
power over non-immigration-related treatment of aliens in the United States, see Bosniak, supra note
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territorial presence secured these rights in the first place.
In the years leading up to Verdugo, Supreme Court opinions
demonstrated a more detailed attention to the importance of geography in
distributing membership rights. Rather than dogmatically applying a
territorial model, the Supreme Court carefully examined the rationales
underlying territoriality. In its 1982 opinion in Plyler v. Doe, the Court
addressed the rationales underlying a territorial model of membership when
it invalidated a Texas statute allowing local schools to deny enrollment to
undocumented children.' 97 The State, the Court held, must afford
undocumented children the same public education offered to their
documented counterparts to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection clause.' Being on the inside of the U.S. border-even
though they lacked authorization to be there-guaranteed the children this
protection: "That a person's initial entry into a State, or into the United
States, was unlawful, and that he may for that reason be expelled, cannot
negate the simple fact of his presence within the State's territorial
perimeter." 99
Two rationales for this "territorial theme" 200 emerge, though not
explicitly, from the Court's reasoning, and both of these rationales
correspond to the rationales discussed earlier in this Article. 20' First,
mutuality of obligation supported the application of a territorial model of
membership. The Court began with the proposition that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects all individuals on whom the State may impose its
laws.202 It followed, then, that because Texas could impose legal
obligations on anyone within its territory-including undocumented
immigrants-Texas, in turn, must afford equal protection of its laws to
anyone within the state-including undocumented immigrants.203
24.
197. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 & 230 (1982). The Texas law withheld state funds for the
education of children not "legally admitted" into the U.S. and allowed local school districts to exclude
those children from public school.
198. Id. at 215 (holding that the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to
the claimant children); Id. at 230 (holding that the Texas statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment
under intermediate scrutiny because it does not further a substantial state interest).
199. Id. at 215.
200. Id. at 212.
201. See supra Part II.A.I.
202. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 212-13.
203. Id. at 214. Though the Court spoke in broad terms about the claimants being within the
territory and therefore entitled to the same public education that their authorized counterparts received,
it is worth noting that its strong territorial reasoning has not since resurfaced to overturn any other state
statutes denying other types of rights to undocumented immigrants. Commentators attribute the Court's
strong language and use of intermediate scrutiny to the involvement of minors who were involuntary
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Second, the need to preserve the character of the community weighed
in favor of affording membership benefits (here, the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment) to the claimants.204 Providing undocumented
children a public education is necessary to preserve "a democratic system
of government"20 5 and "sustain[] our political and cultural heritage."2 06
Notably, the Court did not emphasize fairness to the individual claimants.
The Court focused on preservation of an egalitarian system that "prides
itself on adherence to principles of equality under the law." 207
This "territorial theme," which governed "as dogma for most of American
constitutional history"208 has been equally strong in the Supreme Court's
analysis of the membership rights of those outside the United States. 209 In
In re Ross, a quintessentially territorial case, the Court held that a sailor on
a U.S. merchant ship being tried by a U.S. consular court in Japan had no
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 210 The Ross Court emphatically
within the United States on account of adults' decisions to cross the border without authorization. See
Motomura, supra note 164, 1731-32. This is especially interesting in light of Verdugo, which suggests
that voluntary presence is one of the touchstones of "substantial connections" that would allow an
individual to claim protection under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259, 271 (1990). See also Connell & Valladares, supra note 12 (interpreting Verdugo's holding to
require a substantial connection, sufficed by voluntary presence in the United States, when a search of
an undocumented alien occurs outside the United States).
204. Plyler,457U.S. at221.
205. Id. (quoting Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 219. Though not necessarily a rationale for the Plyler Court's application of a territorial
approach, the claimants' involuntary arrival (as their parents charges) in the United States weighed in
favor of extending rights. That is, though the claimants had never willingly crossed the United States
border, their presence within United States territory was sufficient to protect them. This is in stark
contrast to the plurality opinion in Verdugo, where the Court found the claimant's involuntary presence
in the United States weighed against extending rights. Without voluntarily crossing the U.S. border, the
claimant could not have possibly developed any ties to the United States. Although this might merely be
explained by the Plyler claimants' status as children who were innocent of their parents' initial
unauthorized entry in the territory, it may also illustrate the evolving nature of the post-territorial
approach. While territorial presence alone once controlled the extension of rights in Plyler, it bore
importance in Verdugo only as an opportunity for an individual to develop the required "substantial
connections."
208. NEUMAN, supra note 21, at 7,
209. See, e.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197
(1903); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901);
Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); In re Ross,
140 U.S. 453 (1891). But see, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957) ("The 'Insular Cases' can be
distinguished from the present cases in that they involved the power of Congress to provide rules and
regulations to govern temporarily territories with wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions whereas
here the basis for governmental power is American citizenship."), limited by United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
210. Ross, 140 U.S. at464-65.
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stated, "The Constitution can have no operation in another country."211
Notably, the Court viewed the application of strict territoriality in Ross as
perfectly consistent with territoriality's underlying rationales. The Court
explained that its strictly territorial approach resulted from a lack of
mutuality of obligation between the claimant and the United States. The
claimant had undertaken no obligation to the United States that required
reciprocity on the U.S. government's part; the operation of the U.S.
consular court did not impose obligations upon the claimant that might
require the extension of corresponding protections, but rather as a
gratuitous mitigation of more burdensome obligations that might be
imposed by the host nation. 212 It was by mere diplomatic courtesy-an
agreement between Japan and the U.S.-that the claimant enjoyed the
privilege of being tried by a consular court, rather than a Japanese court.
Thus,
While, therefore, in one aspect the American accused of crime
committed [abroad] is deprived of the guaranties of the constitution
against unjust accusation and a partial trial, yet in another aspect he is
the gainer, in being withdrawn from the procedure of their tribunals,
often arbitrary and oppressive, and sometimes accompanied with
extreme cruelty and torture. 213
Territoriality, for the Ross Court, adequately preserved the notion of
mutuality of obligation.
2. Verdugo's Role in Introducing Post-Territoriality to U.S. Law
In the decades leading up to Verdugo, the Supreme Court had
managed to explain why territory accurately measured membership.214 But
what if a case arose in which territory alone proved an insufficient
substitute for the concept of membership? Verdugo provided just such a
test case, and, understandably, the Supreme Court struggled to answer the
question. Ultimately, the Verdugo plurality seized the opportunity to adopt
a post-territorial approach to the law governing aliens within the United
States but left the corresponding adoption of a post-territorial approach to
the law governing individuals outside U.S. borders to a subsequent case,
Boumediene v. Bush.215 Together, these cases form the framework of an
emerging post-territorial approach to membership that applies on both sides
211. Id. at 464.
212. Id. at 465.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 464; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982).
215. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 755 (2008).
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of the border.
a. Verdugo as the Usher of Post-Territoriality Within the United
States
The defendant in Verdugo posed an unusual combination of
characteristics-one that had never appeared in prior cases. Verdugo was a
foreign national with illegal operations in Mexico who neither lived in the
United States nor claimed to have any connections to the United States.216
Moreover, Verdugo had no wish to enter the United States and evaded U.S.
investigators in Mexico. Investigators secured custody of Verdugo only
after Mexican officials abducted him and delivered him to U.S. officials at
the U.S. border, rendering Verdugo's presence in the United States a mere
accident of being transported against his will.217 Verdugo could just as
easily have ended up Canada or Honduras-his location was completely
involuntary. He clearly had no ties-nor wanted any-to the United States
and had no sense of obligation to U.S. law. This aspect of the case rendered
the territorial approach to membership inadequate.
If territorial presence is meaningful because of its concurrence with
community ties and obligation to the United States, then territory was
meaningless in Verdugo. Applying a territorial model in Verdugo would
have defied one of the defining characteristics of territoriality: that it
awards membership based on choices made by the individual rather than
the government's unilateral decision of which status to grant the individual.
Moreover, denying rights to Verdugo posed little risk of altering the
character of the community, mostly because Verdugo did not claim to be
(and simply could not be) a member of the community. Rather, Verdugo's
detention kept him isolated from the community, and it seemed
inconceivable that a denial of Fourth Amendment rights could alter anyone
else's rights.
With the territorial model inadequately accounting for the unique facts
of the case, the Court could have resorted to a status-based approach.
However, a status-based approach would lead to a bizarre result. Verdugo
was technically authorized to be in the United States in that it was the U.S.
government that physically placed him within U.S. boundaries. Moreover,
applying a status-based approach would have been even less faithful to the
rules and considerations the Court had articulated in Yick Wo, 218 Wong
216. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990).
217. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 262.
218. Yick-Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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Wing,219 and Plyler,220 where the Court had specifically adhered to a
territorial conception of membership in awarding constitutional rights to
immigrants in the United States.
Given the inadequacy of a status-based and territorial approaches to
the question of Fourth Amendment rights for aliens within the United
States, the Verdugo Court could either reject the notion of proxies
altogether and recharacterize prior case law as ultimately requiring
something more significant (in this case, "substantial connections"), or it
could focus on the location of the searched property outside the United
States. The Court understandably did both.
i. Rejecting Strict Territoriality by Recharacterizing Yick Wo
The plurality cast a new light on previous alienage law cases that
distributed rights to foreign nationals in the United States. It claimed that
the Yick Wo line of cases, which had afforded constitutional rights to aliens
in the United States, required something more than territorial presence.221
According to the Verdugo plurality, those cases had required "substantial
connections" with the United States.222 However, even a cursory reading of
Yick Wo and its progeny reveal that the Court had expressly relied on
territory in affording the claimants in each case constitutional rights. In
Yick Wo, the Court had specifically stated: "The fourteenth amendment to
the constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens.. . . [The
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment] are universal in their application,
to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality."223
Arguably, though, Yick Wo and its progeny allocated constitutional
rights based on territorial presence precisely because territorial presence
reflected, among other things, substantial connections with the United
States. As discussed above, an individual's location has historically
corresponded to increased affiliations and ties with individuals and
institutions within the same territory.224 This relationship between location
and connections may have been what the Verdugo plurality was
highlighting when it rejected the notion that territorial presence, in the
absence of "substantial connections," conferred membership rights on an
individual. The Verdugo plurality's statement, then, can be read as a
219. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
220. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
221. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271.
222. Id.
223. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369.
224. See supra Part III.A. I.e.
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recognition that territorial presence is valuable only as an indicator of
something more fundamental-an individual's connections to the United
States. In Verdugo's case, where he had absolutely no connections to the
United States despite being present within its borders, territorial presence
served as an inadequate measure of membership. Thus, the Court had to
look directly to Verdugo's affiliations.
ii. Adhering to Strict Territoriality by Focusing on the Location of
the Search
While the plurality rejected location as an adequate measure of
membership when it came to Verdugo's presence within the United States,
it relied on location when it held that the Fourth Amendment did not extend
to protect against searches of aliens conducted outside the United States. 225
In a sense, the plurality adhered to a territorial approach only insofar as it
denied Verdugo a Fourth Amendment right. Location could exclude
Verdugo from Fourth Amendment protection, but location would not
suffice to include him. In its simultaneous rejection and adherence to
territoriality, it seemed that the plurality was having its cake and eating it,
too.
However, the plurality's inconsistent approach can be explained with
reference to prior case law. The stage had already been set for the
application of a post-territorial approach in the realm of alienage law. As
detailed above, the Court had explained in Plyler and other cases that
territory mattered not for its own sake, but as a proxy for other, more
important measures of membership such as community ties and mutuality
of obligation. In rejecting strict territoriality as far as it guarantees rights to
individuals within the United States, the plurality merely took the next step.
It eliminated territory as a proxy and addressed "substantial connections"
directly. When it came to evaluating the significance of Verdugo's property
being outside the United States, the plurality could not as easily dismiss
strict territoriality.
First, there was simply no need to. The extraterritorial location of
Verdugo's property coincided perfectly with the Court's conclusion that
Verdugo bore no "substantial connections" to the United States and
therefore did not enjoy membership for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment. Besides, since the Court had historically treated rules about
the extraterritorial application of U.S. law separate from rules about the
application of U.S. law to aliens within the United States, it would not have
225. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 266-67.
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seemed odd to treat the two separately in Verdugo. Indeed, it is only in
hindsight and through the lens of membership theory, which treats
exclusion and inclusion as necessary corollaries, that the relationship
between these two areas of law becomes clear.
Second, even if the Court had wanted to introduce a post-territorial
approach to the application of Fourth Amendment rights to individuals
outside the United States, it would have had to recharacterize prior
precedent suggesting that a status-based approach was emerging in that
realm. Indeed, when the Supreme Court had finally overturned Ross's strict
territoriality in Reid v. Covert, it suggested that the claimant's status might
be the determinative factor.226 In Reid, the Court held that two U.S. citizens
living abroad enjoyed the protection of the Constitution and that their
murder conviction by a U.S. military court was invalid without a trial by
jury and indictment by a grand jury.227 The Court focused on the claimant's
U.S. citizenship: "[W]e reject the idea that when the United States acts
against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights." 228
Because Verdugo was not a U.S. citizen and because the search took
place outside of U.S. territory, existing precedent treating the
extraterritorial application of the U.S. Constitution seemed to foreclose the
possibility of applying the Fourth Amendment to the search at issue.
b. Boumediene as the Usher of Post-Territoriality Outside the United
States
The opportunity to fully address the membership model as applied to
individuals outside of the United States and to bring that area of law into
226. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
227. Id. at 18-19.
228. Id at 5. Elsewhere, I have argued that Reid can be characterized as moving toward a post-
territorial approach rather than exclusively toward a status-based approach. See Nilez, supra note 25,
at 845. While the Reid Court emphasized the claimants' citizenship, it did so on the basis of mutuality
of obligation-an underlying rationale of territoriality. The Court explained that the U.S. Constitution
must be applied as both shield and sword, by imposing obligations and affording reciprocal protections:
"When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of
Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped
away just because he happens to be in another land." Reid, 354 U.S. at 6. By invoking their U.S.
citizenship, the claimants had subjected themselves to U.S. jurisdiction and U.S.-imposed obligations
(as arranged by treaty with Japan) and could therefore claim constitutional protections. Id. at 6. To sum
up the principle of mutuality of obligation, the Court aptly quoted an English historian: "In a Settled
Colony the inhabitants have all the rights of Englishmen. They take with them, in the first place, that
which no Englishman can by expatriation put off, namely, allegiance to the Crown, the duty of
obedience to the lawful commands of the Sovereign, and obedience to the Laws which Parliament may
think proper to make with reference to such a Colony. But, on the other hand, they take with them all
the rights and liberties of British Subjects; all the rights and liberties as against the Prerogative of the
Crown, which they would enjoy in this country." Id.
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conformity with the rejection of territoriality as it applied to aliens within
the United States arose in 2008 when the Supreme Court decided
Boumediene v. Bush. 229 There, Guantanamo Bay detainees claimed the
protection of the Suspension Clause and the right to petition in habeas.230
The Court quite explicitly acknowledged that prior precedent suggested
that the status-based and territorial approaches to membership governed the
realm of extraterritorial constitutional law: "In deciding the constitutional
questions now presented we must determine whether petitioners are barred
from seeking the writ or invoking the protections of the Suspension Clause
either because of their status, i.e., petitioners' designation by the Executive
Branch as enemy combatants, or their physical location, i.e., their presence
at Guantanamo Bay." 231
However, the Court rejected both territory and status as accurate
indicators of membership, opting for a more functional approach that
values the underlying rationales of territoriality. Congress, the Court held,
was bound by the Suspension Clause in its provision of a right to habeas
for the detainees despite the detainees' lack of status or presence in the
United States.232 The Court's rejection of strict territoriality rested, in part,
on its failure to preserve the notion of mutual obligations. Guantanamo
Bay, the Court noted, may not be U.S. territory, but it certainly is under
U.S. control: "no law other than the laws of the United States applies at the
naval station." 23 3 Moreover, the effective application of U.S. law at
Guantanamo was neither difficult nor impractical-the United States was
in a position to effectively enforce its law there.234 This contrasted sharply
with the cases in which the Supreme Court and British courts had
historically declined to offer constitutional and other protections outside
state borders. In effect, Westphalian notions of sovereignty did not
accurately describe Guantanamo and therefore did not warrant the
application of strict territoriality.
Boumediene, a case about the right of habeas as it applies to enemy
combatant detainees abroad, obviously does not control the law regarding
the Fourth Amendment rights of aliens inside the United States. However,
the Court's reasoning and ultimate holding do provide significant insight
into the Court's waning adherence to territoriality as a membership model.
229. Boumedine v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
230. Id. at 739.
231. Id (emphasis added).
232. Id at 771.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 770.
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Boumediene has particular relevance as a lens through which to analyze
Verdugo because it delves into the themes of territory and status on which
Verdugo turns. Notably, Justice Kennedy, who had joined Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in Verdugo but had written separately to offer a
different line of reasoning for the decision, wrote for the Court in
Boumediene. Thus, Boumediene ameliorates the seeming division in the
Verdugo opinions and suggests that a more functional post-territorial
approach is indeed taking an increasingly important role in U.S. law-both
inside and outside the border. Boumediene and Verdugo, in this respect, are
opposite sides of the same post-territorial coin.
IV. RESTORING POST-TERRITORIALITY TO THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
Together, Verdugo and Boumediene suggest that strict territoriality no
longer exclusively describes the Supreme Court's distribution of important
constitutional rights. After Boumediene, Verdugo must be interpreted to
adopt a post-territorial approach to the Fourth Amendment, one that rejects
presence within the United States as sufficient for the attachment of rights.
Verdugo and Boumediene,235 read together, indicate that physical borders
neither guarantee nor exclude individuals from constitutional rights. Put
simply, whether an individual is on the north or south side of an imaginary
line turns out to be an inaccurate measure of "membership" for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment. In that sense, Verdugo rejects territorial presence
within the United States as a proxy for a more substantive criterion:
235. Gerald Neuman has argued that Boumediene repudiates Verdugo's "substantial connections"
test. Neuman, supra note 175, at 272 ("Boumediene provides a long overdue repudiation of Rehnquist's
opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez, which Kennedy had nominally joined, while sharply limiting it in his
concurrence."). It is true that, in one sense, a comparison of the holdings would suggest precisely that.
One could argue that the Boumediene Court's willingness to extend constitutional rights to enemy
combatants abroad seriously undermines Verdugo's denial of constitutional rights to an individual
legally present (Verdugo was, after all, brought to the United States by federal authorities) inside the
United States. This makes sense if we assume that status and territory must control the allocation of
constitutional rights. If that is the case, then certainly an authorized person inside U.S. territory deserves
more than does an enemy combatant outside U.S. territory. However, I propose that Boumediene and
Verdugo are reconcilable in that they both reject status and territory as viable exclusive determinants of
membership. Instead, they adopt a more functional approach-a post-territorial approach that does not
merely look to status or territory. While Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Verdugo does suggest that
Justice Kennedy would have opined differently if the search had been in the United States, I do not read
this as a rejection of the substantial connections test, especially when Justice Kennedy did join in the
majority opinion that used the "substantial connections" language. Rather, Kennedy's language in his
concurrence might suggest his opinion that an individual who has property within the United States is
more likely to have the required connections to the United States. In any event, the noteworthy parallel
between Verdugo and Boumediene remains the same: the use of a more functional approach that looks
to something other than rigid proxies for membership in favor of a multi-factored inquiry.
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"substantial connections."
A. STATUS, REJECTED
By looking to the claimant's status, the courts in Esparza-Mendoza
and Gutierrez-Casada implicitly replaced territorial presence with status as
an indicator of-a proxy for-an individual's connections to the United
States. But is status a better proxy for membership than territorial
presence? Can status serve as an indicator of the "substantial connections"
required by Verdugo?
The answer is no. Verdugo and Boumediene foreclose the use of status
as a proxy for membership or "substantial connections." In Verdugo, the
claimant was authorized to be in the United States. In fact, he was brought
to the United States by federal authorities. However, Verdugo's legal status
did not guarantee him Fourth Amendment rights. Verdugo therefore
suggests that even authorized status does not necessarily accurately reflect
"substantial connections" to the United States.
Boumediene similarly rejects status as an accurate proxy for
membership. In Boumediene, an alien whose status was that of an enemy
combatant, a status that is possibly the lowest in the hierarchy of U.S.
236
statuses, was not categorically barred from habeas rights. Thus, the
courts that have interpreted Verdugo as a license to categorically bar certain
classes of undocumented immigrants from Fourth Amendment rights must
re-evaluate Verdugo in light of the larger post-territorial trend evidenced in
U.S. law. The denial of Fourth Amendment rights based exclusively on
status seems incompatible with the reasoning and results in Verdugo and
Boumediene, which denied and allocated rights despite status.
236. In a status-based conception of membership, one might think of citizenship as the highest
level of membership because it secures the full suite of status-based rights available. A variety of other
statuses secure differing rights. A legal permanent resident, for example, does not have the voting
privileges a citizen has. A legal permanent resident, however, has the right to work in the United States,
which an individual present within the United States on a tourist visa does not. In that sense, citizenship
sits at the top of a hierarchy of statuses. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 182, at 2 (describing two
visual representations of membership based on status: one in which citizenship occupies the center-most
of several concentric circles representing lesser statuses and one in which citizenship is at the end of a
horizontal line of statuses); LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF
CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 122 (2006) (describing citizenship as "the ultimate prize at the core" of
concentric circles representing the steps-or statuses-that precede bestowal of citizenship and its
accompanying rights and privileges).
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B. APPLYING THE SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTIONS TEST THROUGH
ALTERNATIVE PROXIES
The rejection of status as a proxy for evaluating "substantial
connections" does not necessarily mean that all proxies are inaccurate.
Courts could certainly develop the contours of a post-territorial approach to
Fourth Amendment rights by identifying categories of connections that
satisfy the "substantial connections" test and track the very essence of what
membership means. Such rules would likely be more nuanced than a purely
territorial or status-based rule, but they would advance post-territoriality
and avoid the encroachment of a status-based model into the vacuum
created by the slow abandonment of strict territoriality.
Cancellation of removal, which I have discussed above, provides a
good example of this process of identifying more accurate proxies. Of
course, the factors that might be relevant in a cancellation of removal case,
which awards permanent legal status, are not necessarily the same factors
that might play into a determination of whether the Fourth Amendment
applies to an individual. The types of connections that will satisfy a right to
Fourth Amendment protections would likely be fewer, and less significant
than the types of connections that allow a court to give an undocumented
immigrant permission to stay indefinitely in the United States despite
having been in removal proceedings.
In fact, using the three factors that I have argued apply to a post-
territorial approach-community preservation, community ties, and
mutuality of obligation-I believe very few cases would call for the denial
of Fourth Amendment rights to an individual voluntarily living within the
United States. Such a denial would pose a serious risk of detrimentally
affecting the Fourth Amendment rights of other individuals such that the
community preservation rationale would weigh heavily against a denial of
rights. Moreover, an individual who voluntarily resides in the United States
likely, although not necessarily, has ties to the surrounding community. An
individual voluntarily within the United States willingly submits herself to
U.S. law because U.S. law is the only law that applies. Thus, mutuality of
obligation weighs in favor of granting such an individual Fourth
Amendment rights. Cases in which these factors do not weigh in favor of
granting Fourth Amendment rights might be quite rare and limited to
scenarios like that of Verdugo or to individuals who cross borders merely
to engage in discreet illegal transactions.
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C. RETHINKING THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH OF ESPARZA-MENDOZA
AND GUTIERREZ-CASADA
The purpose of this paper is not to establish a series of rules that
courts should use to evaluate a Fourth Amendment claimant's connections
to the United States. Rather, my purpose is to challenge the recent trend of
using status as a measurement of membership for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment. The courts in Esparza-Mendoza and Gutierrez-Casada did
just that. At their core, these cases dismissed the respective claimants'
individual substantive connections to the United States and looked directly
to status.23 7 In fact, the court in Esparza-Mendoza limited its discussion of
the claimant's "substantial connections" to a history of the claimant's
interactions with law enforcement and immigration authorities. 238
Ultimately, the courts in these cases failed to examine Verdugo in the
context of the broader trajectory of membership theory in U.S. case law.
Verdugo and Boumediene call for a reevaluation of the meaning of
membership that cuts through antiquated shortcuts and proxies to arrive at
more accurate measures of belonging. While Boumediene analyzed
membership in the domain of habeas relief, Verdugo stripped geography
from the meaning of membership for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
Federal trial courts are now left to fill the created by Verdugo, and they will
hopefully be guided by a close examination of Verdugo in its proper post-
territorial context.
Though few cases have gone as far as the Esparza-Mendoza holding,
it is nonetheless important to highlight their incongruence with emerging
membership theory. First, because criminal law is increasingly the stage for
immigration enforcement, it is likely that more and more cases involving
the Fourth Amendment rights of undocumented immigrants will arise in the
future. This is especially true in light of states' enactment of immigration-
targeted laws requiring law enforcement officers to stop and detain
suspected undocumented immigrants. Second, the tendency to use status as
a proxy for more substantive indicators of membership is gaining ground
237. See United States v. Gutierrez-Casada, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1266, 1272 (2008) (analyzing
the effect of claimant's prior deportation order and concluding that "[a] deportation order effects a
significant change in one's legal status," ultimately rendering him "not entitled to the same Fourth
Amendment protections as are ordinary citizens"); United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d
1254, 1271 (2003) ("In reaching this conclusion, the court has made a categorical
determination.. . . [A]n individual previously deported alien felon is not free to argue that, in his
particular case, he possesses a sufficient connection to this country to receive Fourth Amendment
coverage....").
238. See Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1269-70 (limiting the analysis of the claimant's
"substantial connections" to a discussion of the claimant's history with the INS).
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and may bleed into other areas of alienage law. As a result, the need to
properly contextualize Verdugo is urgent.
V. CONCLUSION
Verdugo has been an unpopular case among commentators because it
threatens to undermine the Fourth Amendment rights of undocumented
immigrants in the United States. These concerns have materialized in cases
like Esparza-Mendoza, in which a district court held that previously
deported alien felons are categorically excluded from the Fourth
Amendment. Though an isolated analysis of Verdugo might suggest that
the Supreme Court broke entirely with an inclusive, territorially based
conception of the Fourth Amendment in favor of a status-based approach, a
broader analysis of the Supreme Court's evolving approach to membership
provides a different interpretation of Verdugo. Read in context, Verdugo is
one piece of a larger trend in which the Supreme Court is slowly removing
one layer of the membership analysis in order to better analyze the deeper,
more substantive, layers, including an individual's ties to the surrounding
community and obligation to the polity.
The Court has not wholly abandoned territoriality. Rather, the Court
has moved beyond territoriality-to a post-territorial approach-by
emphasizing the substantive indicators of membership for which territorial
presence once stood as an effective proxy. Because an individual's
presence within the United States no longer guarantees that the individual
will have community ties or be a part of a mutually reciprocal relationship
with the United States, the Court has begun looking directly to those
substantive factors. Placing Verdugo on a trajectory of the Supreme Court's
approach to membership rescues Verdugo's holding from the clutches of a
status-based approach to membership. Read in the context of this post-
territorial trajectory, Verdugo represents a pivotal moment in the
development of membership theory in U.S. law rather than an arbitrary
aberration. Verdugo signals the development of a model that recognizes the
insufficiency of a single determinant of membership and instead advocates
a multi-faceted approach to membership that evaluates community ties,
mutuality of obligation, and community preservation.
Since Verdugo is just one step in this development, it understandably
leaves the multi-faceted post-territorial approach unclear. Consequently,
courts have injected a status-based approach into the analysis and even
categorically denied certain classes of undocumented immigrants Fourth
Amendment rights. Not only do these courts revert to an oversimplified
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proxy-based system that Verdugo and other U.S. law is slowly rejecting,
but they undermine-even eliminate-fundamental constitutional and other
rights for individuals based on a single determinant.
In redeeming Verdugo's holding rather than repudiating it, this Article
delegitimizes the use of Verdugo to categorically deny undocumented
immigrants Fourth Amendment rights. It also identifies the need for courts,
legislators, and commentators to recognize the trend toward a post-
territorial conception of membership and to avoid adopting inaccurate
proxies as substitutes for a more principled analysis of an individual's
membership in the United States.
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